The Apikorsus Companion v2.0

It's nice when a blog people actually read picks up on important news like the OU's kitniyot waffling on quinoa.

In my last post, I pointed out the different spellings of kitni[y]?o(t|s|th) on the same site, and had simply assumed that there were just a lot of articles with different authors and no style guide. I could easily excuse the headline writer of this article for not carefully reading the article. What I hadn't noticed last time is this page (which is very similar, but not identical to, the content of the PDF Passover Guide), which includes all of the following words, all within two paragraphs:

• machloketh


• kitniyoth


• kitniyot


• kitniyos

Why not just throw in some "kitnios" for good measure?

Labels: judaism, kashrut, kitniyos, kitniyot, kitniyoth, orthodox judaism

Once again, it's time for the annual check on the status of quinoa for Passover. This year, instead of Aish Hatorah, the source of bafflement is the OU.

Their Passover Guide is out and online. The full PDF quotes the now common and relatively safe "ask your Rabbi" (yes, Rabbi is capitalized) position. One article attempts to define "kitnios" (or is it "kitniyot?") logically by reference to the Mishnah Brura, thus stating that quinoa "logically" should be kitniyot, despite all the exceptions that lead to the conclusion that kitniyot defies logic.* (Another baffling statement in the article is that if kitniyot are prepared on Pesach for a permissible reason, "they should be prepared in special non-Pesach and non-chametz utensils, which should not be washed with the Pesach dishes" -- anyone know where that comes from?) The other quinoa-related news on the OU website is the short kitniyot list, which, despite the official "ask your Rabbi" position, says (drumroll please):

The following may be Kitniyot and are therefore not used:
Quinoa
Amaranth

Huh?

* The article was prepared in a word processor with autocorrect turned on. Anyone want to guess how I knew that? :-)

Labels: judaism, kitniyot, passover, quinoa

The beginning of the Tower of Babel story is Genesis 11:1: וַיְהִי כָל-הָאָרֶץ, שָׂפָה אֶחָת, וּדְבָרִים, אֲחָדִים.. The (old) JPS translates "And the whole earth was of one language and of one speech." If you assume that the Bible conserves words, the meaning of this verse must be nontrivial, after all, speaking the same language necessarily implies usage of the the same words.

I would propose that the "one speech" (d'varim achadim) is a hint that everyone was giving the same d'var Torah, resulting in the beginning of the end of the Babylonian project. The languages were confused so that nobody would understand each other and they might come up with some original ideas.

The story was placed in Parshat Noach as a warning to future generations. It didn't work.

PSA: Save the world! If you're giving a d'var torah this week, avoid the Rashi on the first verse of the parsha at all costs.

Labels: judaism, sort-of, Torah

Every year since 2005, I've been tracking the status of quinoa for Passover. I've been using the instructions on the Aish HaTorah website as a guide to when it would be considered kitniyot, on the theory that where that Chareidi kiruv organization goes, soon gets dragged down the Modern Orthodox world, then, whatever they said becomes "universal observant practice." This year, ADDeRabbi beat me to an update, adding in:

I’ve been informed that the Gedolim in Eretz Yisrael consider quinoa to be kitniyot. No surprise there.

Once again, I checked the trusty Aish "all about kitniyot" page. This year, it says:

There is one product called "quinoa" (pronounced "kin-O-ah," or keen-WA) that is the subject of much discussion. Although quinoa resembles a grain, it is technically in the "goose foot" family, which includes sugar beets and beet root. As such, some rabbis (for example, Rabbi Heinemann of Star-K) permit its use even for Ashkenazim on Passover, while other rabbis do not.

Compare that to the text I recorded in 2006. Notice a pattern? Does it conform to the process I described there?

Labels: halacha, judaism, kitniyot, passover, quinoa

It's well known to readers of this blog that my feelings about partnership minyanim (aka, 10+10's) are ambivalent. On the one hand, they are progressive from the Orthodox feminist perspective, in that they allow women some public role in the service. It appears to me that the partnership minyan has quickly been replacing the womens' tefillah group as the preferred way for women to participate in an Orthodox-style service. The partnership minyan may be contrasted with womens' tefillah groups, which have some characteristics that resemble communal prayer, but always seemed (to me, anyway, having never attended one for the obvious reason) as a kind of play-service, where it is made known (through liturgical changes and omissions) to everyone in attendance that none of the additional parts of the service that look like the activities reserved for a minyan really “count” the way they would have had a minyan of men been present. The partnership minyan, on the other hand, is a “real” service, and, in most cases (see below), where women are allowed to do something, what they do “counts” equally. On the other hand, from the perspective of a full-egalitarian, they are regressive, in that women are only allowed to lead parts of the service which are less important (see below for more about that characterization). Perhaps some of my ambivalence is in seeing these minyanim attract people who might otherwise daven in a fully egalitarian style, where womens' position really is (for the most part) considered equal to mens', whereas the partnership minyan still leaves women in an awkward communal position.

Our local partnership minyan linked to the Guide for the 'Halachic Minyan', effectively, a guide for the gabbaim of partnership minyanim to determine what parts of the service they decided women can definitely lead. The guide also gives a brief description of the rationale behind the movement and behind its halachic methodology. The basic assumptions of the partnership minyan, as expressed or implied by the guide, are that women are obligated in prayer (that is, they may pray any time they want), not obligated in specific prayers, nor are they obligated in the separate mitzvah of communal prayer, nor any other time-bound positive commandments. These are absolute constraints, and women cannot accept them upon themselves and become equally obligated. The goal of the enterprise is to maximize womens' participation under these traditional constraints, resulting in a wholly non-traditional form of congregational prayer.

The guide consciously expresses what women can lead in the positive, and is careful not to say “a woman does not lead” any part of the service. Instead, it expresses the same idea as “a man takes over at ...”, describing a practice instead of prescribing halacha. The guide leaves open the idea that increased permission may be discovered at some future time. The guide seeks to rely only on the direct and plain meaning of the halachic literature it uses as its sources, and only uses sources which explicitly permit women to perform the ritual function in question, without making any logical inferences or any original innovations (with respect to halachic issues, but not with respect to stylistic ones). Minority opinions in the literature may be relied upon, even if they contradict traditional practice. In that way, the guide functions as a sort of clearinghouse of permissive rulings in the literature on the issue of womens' participation. The rejection of innovation of new halacha is perhaps the abstract concept that separates the bases of partnership minyanim from fully egalitarian minyanim.

The abstract conception of the position of a woman in the community is also a primary difference. This can be demonstrated by the guide's answer to a question I brought up in a previous post. Namely, what should be done when 10 men are present and fewer than 10 women are present. In comments on that post, most defenders of the partnership minyan movement said that the group should wait or continue to daven as if no minyan were present (even though all agree that a halachic minyan is present in the room). A few indicated that they had seen such a practice followed. That position struck me as strange, given that the group is already making an assumption that communal prayer is a separate obligation from prayer itself. The guide instructs as follows:

Whenever a minyan is required, it is common practice, to wait for 10 men and 10 women to start pray[sic] (as long as the time of tefilla [Zman Tefilla] has not passed) besides when women are counted for a minyan such as in the case of megilah reading on Purim. (emph added)

As I argued in my previous post and its comments, the function of the 10 women is to hold up an already-present halachically-valid minyan of 10 men, not to contribute positively toward a minyan of 20. The 10+10 custom is acknowledged to be secondary to the halacha, a position that is fully consistent with the current assumptions of the movement. It does, however, support the conception that the function of women in a 10+10 is subtractive, not additive.

The idea that men are given primacy over women, even for things they are otherwise allowed to do is still present, at least in some congregations (eg, in the divisions of aliyot — “some congregations reserve a majority of aliyot for men” on the basis of Rema OH 282:3). A similar note indicates that some congregations reserve the first two aliyot for men when a kohen or levi is not present. (If the kohen/levi precedence for the first two aliyot is considered to be a purely historical artifact, then only men would take the first two aliyot, even in a fully egalitarian minyan.) The movement, although it has gone a long way [over traditional Orthodox practice] in allowing limited womens' participation, has not completely abandoned the idea that womens' participation in prayer services is a denigration of the honor of the congregation. By citing these halachic sources, the movement implies that women are, at best, ancillary members of the congregation (which is traditionally defined as the men only).

I often characterize the services at partnership minyanim as ones where “women do things that aren't important.” The guide divides the service into three categories. The first category is that of parts of the service that women can lead — those that may be left out of the service, or may be led even by a child. The other two types are parts in which womens' participation may be considered problematic or is apparently barred. The methodology used for approaching the second and third categories is a bit more instructive than the first. Where sources are found for womens' obligation (such as Hallel on the first night of Passover), they are allowed to participate equally. Another method used for finding room for womens' participation, where it is deemed possible, is to find halachic opinions that reduce the level of obligation associated with the particular prayer such that it no longer has communal importance. An alternative approach is used for Hallel on Festivals, in which it states that the leader need not fulfill the congregation's obligations.¹ Parts of the service containing devarim sh'biqedusha are (as of now) non-negotiably led entirely by men. Some partnership minyanim have adopted the practice of assigning any part of the service (excluding the Torah reading) that can be led by women to a woman. This essentially divides the entire service leadership on the basis of gender. In a sense, it is inclusive, but counter-egalitarian.

The partnership minyan movement also calls itself “halachic egalitarian” (a term full egalitarians do and should consider objectionable). The guide goes through considerable trouble to defend the use of the term:

This guide does not refer to parts of the tefillah that are categorized as devarin shbiqdusha, in which the chazzan fulfills the congregation's obligation. It is not our intention to claim that communities in which women lead these parts of the prayer are not halachically justifiable. ...
In conclusion, a word about the name “halachic minyan.” The congregations for which this guide is intended have been described by many names. From among them this name has been chosen as it is meant to describe the essence of the process by which the practices of these congregations are determined and the nature of their connection to the tradition of halachic decision making. Halachah is the basis upon which we stand. With the chosen name we mean to convey that, despite our departure from traditional practice to include women, we may only innovate as far as the Halachah, as recorded in the writings of traditional decisors, permits. The name thus functions descriptively, not contrastively. We do not at all mean implicitly to denigrate other practices and movements as non-halachic.

It is difficult to parse out an entirely positive interpretation of the name, without it being a comparative term. Did not the movement which calls itself “traditional egalitarian” jump through hoops to justify their practice within halacha (albeit under a moderately different set of halachic assumptions)? The guide leaves open that it is not a final answer to the question of womens' participation, and that further progress innovation allowances may be made discovered in the future. Both movements essentially started with a goal and trawled the literature for their defenses. Both accept that minority opinions in the literature may be relied upon, and may even overturn traditional practice.

¹ I once attended an Orthodox service on a Festival night following Shabbat at a college Hillel, where the custom in the Hillel's dining hall was for a woman to make kiddush at the meal, and for a man to lead birkat hamazon. (This was clearly a concession to the Orthodox minyan which did not want women leading birkat hamazon). The Orthodox minyan held that a woman could not fulfill the congregation's obligation (the partnership minyan gabbai guide says that they may). The gabbai of the minyan made an announcement after services, which essentially said that the kiddush and havdalah that would be made later by a woman would not fulfill everyone's obligation and that they should all say it for themselves. Had I been the woman making kiddush, I would have found that announcement mildly insulting, even though I could fully appreciate the halachic basis. I would hope that the partnership minyan could handle this issue more tactfully.

Labels: davening, halacha, judaism, modern orthodoxy, orthodox judaism

One friend (who will remain nameless to protect the guilty) made the claim that our kitchen is not kosher because we use one oven for milk and meat. Not that it was not in accordance with her stricture. But, that it was not kosher.¹. I went ahead and made the claim that the idea that one needed a separate milk and meat oven is one of the piled-on modern chumrot. I underestimated the amount of time that it took to enter halacha. I originally put it at about 40 years (see below), but it turns out that the theory can be traced to a longer-running dispute that I'm not sure how much significance it had for practical halacha.

The Internet has some very good resources. ²

As you can see from the sources (I won't repeat the details, if you want them, see the links above), the primary problem that is discussed in the literature until the Rema (16th century) is cooking kosher and non-kosher in the same oven simultaneously. The Rema inserts that milk and meat and kosher/non-kosher have the same laws, and that consecutive use under the same covering might be problematic because the steam (not the "aroma," which is essentially halachic cooties) from one food might change the status of the other. The ensuing halachic debate revolves around how steam transfers food-gender. Does it only work directly (from one steamy pot to another above it)? Does it work indirectly (from one steaming pot to anything else in the same enclosed atmosphere)? Does it work through enclosures? Does steam embed in the oven? Do all hot things produce steam with the same halachic status?

It also appears that "steam" the Rema is worried about is an actual physical entity, not halachic cooties. It is directly analogized to the condensation that appears on a pot cover. Note also that this explains the Rosh's (13th century)³ seemingly paradoxical conclusion that steam doesn't affect hot pots, where one would ordinarily expect that heat would worsen the transfer: water doesn't condense above its boiling point.

Our approach is never to cook or heat milk and meat in the same oven at the same time, and to allow the oven to cool down before switching genders. It is cleaned if recognizable food particles are present. In practice, it is an implementation of the Aruch Hashulchan's position, but, in theory, it's somewhere between those of the Aruch Hashulchan and Lichtenstein/Feinstein's. The added chumra is that even if the steam from consecutive use is important, we are worried about an actual physical entity. The actual steam from food is evacuated when the door to the oven is opened to remove the food (and the air inside exchanges with the air outside), and that if anything recognizable condenses during the cool-down cycle, it can be cleaned.

As noted in Rabbi Mordechai Broyde's article, the Aruch Hashulchan's position "was the custom in Eastern Europe a century ago."

In fact, three of the four practices with halachic-literature bases ((1) use the same [clean] oven for both, but not at the same time (2) use the same [clean] oven for both, with a 24 hour waiting period OR one hour at maximum temperature in between, (3) use the same [clean] oven for both, covering either dairy or meat liquids,⁴ (4) not using the same oven for both unless one is double-wrapped) allow the same oven to be used for milk and meat, with only the procedure for their use varying.

The practical implication is that it's possible to have a fully functional and fully kosher kitchen without being super-wealthy. That is, until the chumra police make you need a second oven.

---

¹ Actually, she compared eating at our house to "eating out" (in the Jewishism sense), and effectively treats food we cook as treif. It was later modified to a "lower level transgression" instead of actual treifness.

² For other resources, one wonders if they deliberately archaize the text ("a housewife should...") in order to sound more "traditional" or "authentic," or if the writers really live in a hole.

³ But didn't I say that this problem isn't discussed until the 16th century? Indeed, I did. The problem the Rosh is discussing is steam emitted directly onto another pot. The question of import here is whether steam that is emitted, condensed, and re-emitted is significant.

⁴ Reading about this subject has made me wonder whether popular misunderstanding of Rav Moshe Feinstein's position (or the other variants of it) contributes to the idea that one needs two separate ovens. It does require that one designate an oven as "meat" or "dairy" and pareve items that are cooked in it uncovered are considered to have the status of "meat equipment" or "dairy equipment." Yet, still a "meat" oven can be used to cook covered dairy liquids or uncovered dairy solids. Does the concept of designation itself lead people toward acceptance of the strictest opinion?

Labels: conservative judaism, halacha, judaism, kashrut, orthodox judaism

This J-Post article is setting the blogosphere abuzz about Rabbi David Hartman's decision to offer Orthodox rabbinic ordination to women at the Shalom Hartman Institute. The popular press rhetoric is certainly the rhetoric of egalitarianism. Rabbi Donniel Hartman, co-director of the institute and son of David Hartman, is quoted as saying:

"The classic distinctions between men and women are no longer relevant. People who come to the Hartman Institute to study are committed to making gender equality in Judaism a reality."

Now, here's the description of the program:

Melamdim also offers an optional Rabbi-Educator track – the first rabbinic ordination program of its kind. Tailored to the distinct professional needs of rabbis who serve as North American community high school educators, the track is open to students of both sexes and all denominations who are interested in pursuing an MA degree, teaching career and rabbinic ordination at the same time.
Target Population
The program is open to individuals of all denominations from Israel and North America, who satisfy the following criteria:

• Hold a BA either in Jewish studies or in Bible, Talmud or Jewish Philosophy


• Have a good knowledge of Hebrew


• Have a knowledge of classical Jewish texts


• Commit to fulfill the program’s considerable study and work requirements


• Commit to work as a teacher in a Jewish high school for at least three years after graduating from the program

It looks like it's offering the status of rav hamaggid, the lowest level of ordination which entitles the bearer to hold the title of "rabbi" and to teach. It does not confer the status of halachic decisor. It does not automatically allow one to perform the functions commonly associated with pulpit rabbis (which was the focus of the Conservative teshuvot in the 1970's and 1980's). One can argue that this status is not an equivalent of nor a modern replacement for "traditional" (Talmudic?) rabbinic ordination.

In Modern Orthodox circles, many high schools already allow women to be taught Talmud, a few more allow women to teach Talmud to men. Most already have women teaching some subjects, implying that they do not consider teaching high school to be serara (holding a position of communal authority), so, they do not have to face that halachic boundary. Judaic studies teachers who hold the title of "rabbi" are probably paid at a higher level for their advanced degree, which is a path toward career advancement previously not open to women. If a high school were to accept Hartman's ordination of a woman, they may then be forced to pay her at an equal rate to men who hold the same type of degree.

Even so, women who graduate from the program would have a second-class status, even as a rav hamaggid. They could function as high school teachers (the intent of the training in the program), but they could not function as pulpit rabbis, the other career path for a rav hamaggid, because their activities are still restricted by Orthodox interpretations of halacha.

In sum, this may affect teachers' pay and titles (and we aren't even sure if the title "rabbi" will be conferred on a woman), but it doesn't look like there's anything truly ground-breaking coming out of it.

Labels: halacha, judaism, modern orthodoxy, orthodox judaism

If you're not a member of a Young Israel (and maybe if you are), you can get a good laugh out of the National Council of Young Israel's proposed new standards for Young Israel rabbis and synagogues. You may be even be amused to find out that NCYI thinks it has power to set standards. (The standards, as best as I understand them, include (1) that a central board has to vet rabbinical hirings by local Young Israels, (2) that women and converts can't serve as synagogue presidents, and that (3) no Young Israel can run womens prayer groups or megillah readings).

The YU Commentator ran an article on it, pointing out that it's an attempt by the Chareidi segment of Young Israel to take control from the left-wing Modern Orthodox. NCYI president Shlomo Mostofsky responded to the article in a comment on their website. In it, he said:

Synagogues and communities that have joined the Young Israel movement over the past 96 years are proud to be identified with the standards of halacha and hadracha that our founding Torah-true lay leaders and rabbis were moser nefesh to establish. (emph. added)

The punch-line: It's nice to know that the NCYI president considers Mordechai Kaplan to have been a "Torah-true rabbi!"

Labels: judaism, modern orthodoxy, orthodoxy

This is a set of collected quotes from Ismar Elbogen's Jewish Liturgy: A Comprehensive History. Some of them are in context, some a bit out of context.

The book was originally written in German (1913, 1ed; 1924, 2ed; 1931, 3ed), then translated to Hebrew by Joseph Heinemann and others (1972) and translated from Hebrew and German to English by Raymond Scheindlin (1993). In the foreward, the translator refers to "precious traces of the man behind the book and of the intellectual climate of his times ... scattered throughout" the book. This post can be thought of as something of a celebration of the more entertaining aspects of those "traces." Footnotes have been removed. All emphasis and commentary is added unless otherwise noted. Page numbers are from the 1993 JPS edition.

On the kedushah (in Yotser):

The verbose character of our text, which serves as a transition and which appears in Saadia in a very abbreviated form, is apparently no older than the geonic period, having originated in the circles of the Merkava mystics, who strove mightily in their prayers to comprehend the godhead. They longed for visions; and the heaping up of hymns is a tried and true means of achieving ecstasy that was practiced by mystics in every age. (p18)

On birkat haminim:

In modern prayer books the text has been subjected to many alterations, but the most sensible change is to eliminate it entirely, as was done in the Berlin prayer book (p46)

On kiddush:

In the course of time, when the synagogue ceased serving this purpose [as a hostel for travelers], doubts were expressed about the propriety of saying Kiddush there, but no one dared to act on these doubts. Here is a classic example of how religious rites, once they have taken root, cannot be removed by the force of logic.(pp94-95)

Here's Elbogen as reviewer. When talking about the kingship verses in High Holiday services, he opines:

The author did not succeed equally in all parts of this prayer; the introduction to the Kingship verses excels in its cohesiveness and elevated theme, and no less by its beauty of expression. ... Likewise, in "You remember," the splendid opening hymn deserves praise, though it repeats the same theme too many times. The transition to the biblical verses is an obvious failure ...(p120)

Much of the compiled history of the liturgy is based on speculation and educated guessing. Perhaps the most blatant example is the reason given for the recitation of the "Ribbono shel olam" paragraphs in birkat kohanim:

Distinguished authorities admonished the congregations to say the verses only while the precentor was calling out the words, and to listen in silence when the priests repeated them;but the hubbub of the verses drowned out the words of the Blessing in spite of all the reproaches. Another equally bad and equally severe practice arose from the terror of nightmares common in Babylonia ... (p64)

The plague of nightmares being one consequence of:

Likewise, there is no overlooking the fact that Babylonia is the source of every superstition in the world. Some of the amoraim were affected by these errors of their native land, and were subject to fear of demons, nightmares, and witchcraft. ... Especially in later centuries, when every word in the Talmud was seen as binding, and when people lived in fear of witches and demons, these errors led to sorry consequences [for the liturgy]. (p212)

The entire gemara in one sentence:

The amoraim strived to achieve two things: to bring everything into fixed forms, and to imitate the exemplary behavior of famous men.

leading up to:

thus, it is hardly astonishing that in such an important realm as prayer they observed the behavior of the great men of the age very closely, and recommended that it be imitated. This could have a deleterious effect, when observances undertaken by the individual as stringencies meant for himself, with no thought of making them binding on others, later were turned into generally valid norms. In the amoraic period this did not yet happen, or it happened only seldom, but in later centuries it was a common phenomenon, one that was not always beneficial to religious institutions. Another goal, or at least a common tendency, was to increase the amount of praying. Unlike in the preceding centuries in which short prayers were considered the best, this generation found no harm in lengthy prayers; on the contrary, these were even thought desirable, though the principle that the congregation not be unduly burdened was never rescinded. (pp211-212)

On mysticism:

At the book's [Hekhalot rabati] end are hymns intended for the highest level of ecstasy, including האדרת והאמונה, "The splendor and the faithfulness," which has entered nearly all prayer books and is composed of that abundance of half-intelligible words typical of the prayers of these mystics. The intense veneration of God is expressed through the heaping-up of words that are equivalent in meaning and similar in sound, but that say little and do not advance the train of thought. ... In all this they differ considerably from the sober piety of the Bible, the Talmud, and the ancient prayers, which were oriented rather toward the psalmists' proverbial words, "to You silence is praise." (p287)

Don't take the drugs, because after the high comes the low:

On the other hand, there were plenty of sober thinkers who denounced the forcible inducing of ecstasy, not only because this state is not always attained, but because even when it is, the soul afterwards sinks back into a state of confusion. In fact this whole movement [Thirteenth century Ashkenazic pietism] was one of unhealthy extremes; the period was deficient in clear and prudent thinking, and a great deal of superstition became part of the mixture.(p290)

The Zohar's fantastic ideas freed many downtrodden people from the burdens of their lives; the spiritual uplift that they experienced in traditional prayer and in the recitation of the kabbalistic hymns gave them a taste of the world to come in the midst of the hell of their everyday lives. But at the same time we must not close our eyes to the severe harm done to Jewish piety by kabbalistic theory. It turned prayer into a tool for forcibly bringing about magical effects. by introducing intermediaries [angels] between God and man, it spelled a fateful regression in the history of the Jewish religion. Finally, the new doctrine fave a boost to all kinds of superstition.(p291)

Skip a few centuries and...

Lurianic mysticism, with its liturgical innovations, spread in every direction as swiftly as an infectious disease.(p293)

One of those damaging influences from Kabbalah was kabbalat shabbat:

The Sabbath service is introduced by an element not known in the Middle ages, the Welcoming of the Sabbath. It originated in the circle of kabbalists in Safed at the end of the sixteenth century, whose influence on Jewish life was a lasting and unhappy one. (p92)

Among these [additions to the service from Lurianic kabbalah] are some of a very high level, for the kabbalists undeniably knew how to choose materials that uplifted the heart and encouraged a spirit of piety. But there are also many passages attesting to the crassest superstition. There is no doubt that these peculiarly Lurianic innovations, such as the tikunum, kavanot and yihudim, which have long vanished from the western European prayer books, imposed a heavy burden on religious life and were actually a mockery of true prayer. (p294)

And, finally, Hasidism:

According to its principles, Hasidism represents an absolute rebellion against the synagogue service, and no more convincing proof exists of the intolerable condition of the synagogue service than the fact that so many turned their backs on it — no t out of lack of faith or out of skepticism, but out of a longing for piety. This should have been taken as a serious warning that the liturgy was in need of revision. But no change occurred because Hasidism did not keep to the oppositional position of its founders, but instead sought compromise with rabbinic Judaism. Thus, its effect on the synagogue service was more deleterious than it was an improvement. It strengthened the conservative tendency of faith in the written word, the ascetic spirit of renunciation, and the striving to compel the advent of the messianic age; it brought with it new plagues in the form of commotion and unrestrained wild gestures.

Going to shul has no positive benefit if you're not sitting their quietly, frowning.

On the study of detailed halacha about the order of nonessential prayers:

Already in 1313 Menahem b. Joseph of Troyes wrote his סדר טרוייש, "Rite of Troyes" for the explicit purpose of instructing the precentors on how to conduct the service in accordance with the true custom of the Troyes community ... The contents of [its] ten chapters ... bear no relationship to the importance claimed for the book in its introduction. They deal with prayers whose text had never been fixed, and the reciting of which had formerly been up to the judgment of the congregation — for example, the use and placement of the psalms, the Supplications, the prayers during the Torah reading, the exact fixing of the pericope in the Torah and Haftara, and, finally, the selection of piyyut and seliha. ... [After the Black Plague (1348-9),] These studies had some justification to the extent that their purpose was the reestablishment of the continuity of tradition and to the extent that they served to overcome the disorder and confusion that had spread to many places. But they went much further, and bestowed such exaggerated attention on such minuscule matters and unimportant habits that we can only view it as morbidity, the pathetic sign of a period of decadence.(p282) ... [After the Shulhan Arukh,] care for customary practice became a morbid obsession, confirming the harsh observation of a medieval sage that excessive concentration on the custom could lead the communities to perdition.(p283)

The worst consequence of [the development of the printed siddur] was the deification of the letter. ... The deadly force of reverence for the letter caused great harm to the liturgy, for the spirit that had the power to revive it was moribund. In the absolute absence of general education, discipline, and order, the effort to dislodge the rigid faith in the written letter led to such disruptions that, on the threshold of the modern age, the form of the liturgy had become absolutely untenable.(p285)

On the scourge of liturgical poetry:

The first attempt to embellish the liturgy of festivals and fast days, ... already involved additions of the type that may be called piyyut ... Nevertheless, these compositions were of a very different type from piyyut in the narrow sense of the term. First, they always remained separate from the statutory prayers, never penetrating them as did the piyyut, which interrupted the traditional sequence of the service. Second, they are distinguished from the piyyut — and this must be stressed as strongly as possible — in the simplicity of their form, the modesty of their language, and the intelligibility and clarity of their expression. (p221)

The poems first composed [for selihot] were simple and unadorned, but deeply felt; later came elaborate structures in which the artificiality of the form often suppressed the content.(p179)

To this [Aramaic] translation [of the Torah reading] poetic introductions in the Aramaic language were also composed; one of them, אקדמות מלין, "The beginning of words," has been preserved to this day in our holiday prayer book for the first day of Pentecost. These poems were never intelligible, but now, with the elimination of the translation that they were intended to introduce, they have completely lost their significance and their right to exist.(p154)

The! downfall! of! Piyyut!

How great was the religious feeling excited by the piyyut! What courage it offered the downcast! What consolation it instilled in the despairing! But the convenient accessibility of the material could easily become and inducement to facile rhyming, encouraging many who were not poets to try their hand at writing piyyutim.

Did you start thinking of the Sim Shalom when you read that?

Fixed forms were established that were too easy to use; the same places in the service and the same occasions attracted the same ideas: Certain themes like the suffering of the Ten Martyrs, the binding of Isaac, and the recitation of the Kedushah by the Hosts of Heaven came to be constantly repeated and treated in routine cliches. It was intrinsically hard to invent original and telling ways of expressing all these things; only few succeeded, but many became longwinded and indulged in monotonous repetition.(p227)

Like the letters of the alphabet, biblical verses may be used in the most varied combinations. One of the most artificial combinations, fortunately an uncommon one, is the qerova for the Ninth of Av by Kallir in Rome. The first line of each stanza begins with the first word of the successive verses of Lamentations chapter 5, which does not have the alphabetical acrostic and with the first word of a verse from chapter 4; the three following lines begin with the opening word of the verses of chapter 3 in reverse order (3,2,1,6,5,4), and the fifth and sixth lines begin with the opening word of a verse from chapters 2 and 1. The sixth line ends with the last two words of the verses of chapter 5 with which the stanza began. But even this does not exhaust the complexity of the piyyut, which is considerably increased by the rhyme.(p228)

With a certain amount of practice it would be possible to find one's way through the unusual and incorrect word formations, but what makes the synagogue poetry particularly difficult, and often impossible to enjoy is the obscurity of the poets' manner of expression.

With their depth of feeling, the loftiness of their ideas, and the purity of their language, th[e "classic" liturgical poets] came near the biblical psalms, for these were the true poets who undertook to speak, while the great majority of synagogue poets had no poetic talent. The didactic contents of the piyyut, the display of external form, and the invention of word forms were easy to imitate, and the congregations' demand for this new adornment of the liturgy was intense. Thus, the custom of composing liturgical poetry spread like a contagious disease. ... The error was not in the act of composing piyyutim, but in the unrestrained versifying, by the compulsion felt by people lacking any specific feeling of linguistic understanding to compose piyyutim and selihot.(p234)

As manuscripts decreased and printed books proliferated, as understanding for historical and local character decreased, as meaningless customs came to be adhered to more stubbornly, the more entrenched did the piyyut become, and the less could its position be shaken by even the chief authorities of religious law... The modern period has mercilessly eliminated the great mass of unintelligible and worthless poems ... and has no compunctions about retaining in the prayer book piyyutim of true poetic value.(p237)

Saadia's poetic efforts were important in that not only did he try hsi own hand as a poet, but he dealt with the theory of poetry as well. The many worthless poems circulating in his time caught his attention and induced him to compose a kind of textbook for the improvement of the language and style of the poets.(p251)

It didn't satisfy Elbogen, though:

Saadia ... did no better; if Kallir's poems must be called obscure, Saadia's are books with seven seals.(p234)

The one true religion™:

a change occurred in the tenth and eleventh centuries; poetic selihot became more and more entrenched, displacing the earlier simple, nonrhyming compositions, which were often superior to all the artificial productions of later times in poetic spirit and, above all, in depth of religious feeling.(p254)

[Sahlal b. Nethaniel]'s poetry exemplifies some of the strange fruit that the liturgical poetry bore; though completely artificial, pedantic, and remote from both the content and tone of true prayer, it nevertheless enjoyed great esteem in the Middle Ages.(p255)

Can't argue with him here:

For the Additional Service [Meshulam b. Kalonymus] composed two versions of the Avoda, including אמיץ כח, "Mighty in Strength," used in Ashkenaz. Among known Avodot, this work is the least regular in its poetic structure; it is typical of the later Ashkenazic poets as well, in that they often neglect the fundamental principle of poetry, uniformity of pattern. Surprisingly, we find that the poem lacks rhyme. It has been shown that the author's intention was to abridge the Avoda of Yose [b. Yose, an earlier payyetan] to put it into the form more in accordance with the taste of his contemporaries, full of hard words and complicated expressions. Besides the alphabetical acrostic, he also had to devise a relatively lengthy acrostic for his own name. Because he was not able to extricate himself from all these difficulties, his Avoda came out very irregularly — sometimes they were very condensed, jumping from idea to idea, and at other times they went into great detail.(p253)

In which I learn that my usual practices or practices with which I am quite familiar are unheard of in modern times:

The modern suggestion to shorten the weekly [Torah] readings and have the congregation [as opposed to a rabbi or cantor] again do the reading itself has gained no attention anywhere. (p140)

Certainly this paying for ritual functions [aliyot/synagogue honors] was bound to lead to undesirable consequences, especially since for a time, they were even sold at public auction to the highest bidder. (p142)

(you know who you are).

Occasions on which I learn that I'm either uncivilized, or live in an uncivilized country:

In all civilized countries the external form of the liturgy underwent more or less fundamental improvements. Choral singing was introduced everywhere, accompanied by organ in France and Italy, while the liturgy itself remained unchanged.(p319)

In the manner of such customs, the secondary eventually becomes primary, and "May He Who blessed" [מי שברך] became for the unlettered the most important part of the Torah reading. Gradually the unfortunate situation arose that the blessings multiplied to a horrifying degree, leading to the excessive prolongation of the service, diverting attention from the reading itself, and opening the way to all kinds of abuse. The interruption of the Torah reading for the recitation of private blessings was long ago eliminated in all progressive countries.(p161)

Quiet and order, dignity and reverence in worship are such self-explanatory requirements for civilized people, and approach so nearly the precepts of traditional Judaism, that the most conservative circles recognized that they were justified, and everywhere efforts were made to realize them. The refinement of the cantorial rendition and the introduction of harmonic choral singing were also demanded from every quarter and were put everywhere into effect for the beautification of the service.(p325)

It's like Judaism: the musical. Just sit back quietly and enjoy.

Quietly:

Merely listening did not satisfy the congregation; they wanted to pray along with the precentor or they sought to pass the time in other ways. The result of both was disruptive, necessitating a thorough revision in the modern period.(p381)

Just don't enjoy too much:

Often the reading of the scroll [of Esther] was accompanied by customs intended to release the overwhelming feelings of joy, and these not infrequently took on wild form; . . . In Reform congregations, the reading of the Scroll of Esther has mostly been limited to the Morning Service, while in the evening it is replaced by a selection in the vernacular. The noisy disturbances have been eliminated in every civilized country.(p110)

In the course of time, the Joy of the Torah became a popular festival in the synagogue, and the processions a kind of popular amusement for observers; in less cultivated times and places these generated into wild excesses and indecorous behavior.(p160)

Uh oh. Someone may have smiled in shul.

The Frankfurt rabbinical conference (1845) had a way of preventing that from happening too often:

The commission had proposed the introduction of the triennial cycle; this was accepted with a great majority. The festival of the Joy of the Torah was therefore to be celebrated only once in three years.(p313)

But the greatest advance in Jewish prayer since the advent of sliced bread is...

The classical historian of the sermon was Leopold Zunz; his book ... is one of the chief factors that enabled the sermon, in the course of the last century, to regain the place in the synagogue that it had in ancient times. Thanks to it, the last seventy years have seen regular liturgical instruction successfully reassert itself in Jewish communities, irrespective of religious inclination, in every civilized country, and the vernacular sermon has once again become an integral part of the Sabbath and festival service. (p157)

... the (return of the) sermon. But,

in the great synagogues of our time the problem often arises that one does not find individuals who combine intellectual capacity, vocal power, and rhetorical skill.(p158)

On the bright side, nap time returned to the synagogue.

On the need for reform:

The liturgy could not go completely untouched by this mighty upheaval in the lives and thinking of the Jews. Its forms no longer suited the demands of a new age. They repelled both eye and ear, and could neither satisfy the mind nor warm the heart. ... A tiny group of intelligent people sought reforms that would not harm the essence of the liturgy, such as the simplification of the prayers, the elimination of the bad customs that had infected the liturgy, and the introduction of aesthetic forms and conduct appropriate to the house of God.(p297)

I guess that means not sitting in the back of shul talking.

...and the backlash against it

...in other Prussian communities such as Breslau and Koenigsberg, the German sermons that by now had been in use for quite some time were eliminated. Thus for several decades all progress in the synagogue service in the territory of the Prussian kingdom was blocked.(p302)

On nusach:

... synagogue melody was transplanted to the West, to the detriment of congregations and the liturgy. For those precentors schooled neither in the Hebrew language nor in music, the "melody" became the main thing, and prayer was forced into the background, its text mercilessly corrupted.(p384)

And other forms of synagogue singing:

A strange error was the introduction of choir boys in Poland, a practice perhaps still known to this day in the East, and which even in Germany had for centuries the most harmful influence on the liturgy. ... On either side of the precentor stood a singer, who accompanied his singing in a higher or lower voice — and who was therefore called singer and bass—sounding harmonic intervals and sometimes performing small solo passages. This kind of singing could generally be heard everywhere until the middle of the last [19^th] century (it was still customary in Berlin until 1840); it intensified the disorder and tastelessness in the extreme.

From the Jews-will-be-Jews department:

On April 2, 1846, the congregation [Association for Reform in Judaism, Berlin] moved into its own synagogue building, and after a long struggle it was decided to hold services twice a week, on Saturday and on Sunday. The leadership of the congregation declared themselves in favor of Saturday services and voted decisively against shifting the Sabbath to Sunday; in the end they came to an agreement that services of identical status should be held on both days, and that neither day should be treated as a solemn one.(p315)

The radicalism with which the Reform congregation developed its liturgical institutions was easy to put into effect, when the congregation was founded for this purpose. But conditions were much harder in the existing congregations in which the new liturgy was to be introduced ... Violent disputes were unleashed even by matters of no importance at all, like calling people up to the Torah by name or the elimination of the first "May the salvation arise," the prayer for the ancient Babylonian authorities who had not existed for centuries.(p317)

It's about the first יקום פורקן, and it wasn't intended to be humorous.

[In 1840's Hungary] Bitter, sometimes bloody battles were fought over the most insignificant minutiae of synagogue construction and liturgical custom.

In Studentville, too. Without the blood.

Take this, Carlebach:

For nearly every prayer an individual melody was formed, and a special recitative for Sabbaths and festivals. Special pleasure was taken in singing the Verses of Song in the Morning Service, which was done at length. In Regensberg a full hour was needed just for the prayer "Blessed is He Who spoke" [ברוך שאמר], and the same amount of time was used by Isserlein in Weiner Neustadt during the period from the first of Elul to the Day of Atonement [presumably for לדוד? selichot?].

Labels: classical reform judaism, humor, judaism, liturgy

I am not a historian, nor am I an economist, so, you can take this all with a grain of salt. I thought it was kind of a fun question.

In this week's parsha, chayyei sarah, we learn that the cave of machpelah was bought by Abraham from Ephron the Hittite for 400 shekels of silver (Gen 23). Converting the shekel into a standard unit is not trivial, but, let's say we take it to be the average of Wikipedia's quoted values, ~13g of silver/shekel, making 400 shekel ~ 5200g silver.

Manhattan was bought for goods that were equivalent in value to 60 Dutch guiders in 1626. Thanks to some analysis provided by a role playing game, we can estimate what a guilder was worth in 1632, and extrapolate that it's about the same in 1626. According to that document, one guilder was supposed to be equivalent to a Venetian ducat, which was standardized at 3.5 g gold. Between the medieval period and the early 18th century, the value of gold to silver went from 12:1 to 15:1. Assuming one gram of gold was worth about 14g of silver, one guilder was worth ~49g of silver, and 60 guilder was worth ~2940g silver.

So, the cave of machpelah was almost twice as expensive as Manhattan.

Other than the assumptions about the accuracy of the sources, an additional assumption here is that one gram silver was worth the same amount to Abraham as to the 17th century Dutch. It is most likely incorrect.

Labels: humor, judaism, parsha

In a moment of boredom in shul, I was looking at the text of the Pidyon Haben ceremony (in a Birnbaum Ashkenazic siddur, it's about the same in the Artscroll).

The kohen says:
מאי בעית טפי -- ליתן לי בנך בכורך שהוא פטר רחם לאמו? או בעית לפדותו בעד חמש סלעים? כדמחויבתא דאורייתא
What would you like to do: do you choose to give me your firstborn son who opened the womb of his mother? or do you choose to redeem him for five selaim? as you are required from the Torah.

According to the standard text, the father answers:
חפץ אני לפדות את בני והילך דמי פדיונו כדמחויבתי דאורייתא
I choose to redeem my son, and here is the worth of his redemption that is required of me by the Torah.

But, what if he answers:
חפץ אני ליתן לך את בני והילך בני כדמחויבתי דאורייתא
I choose to give you my son, and here is the my son as required of me by the Torah.

Textual note: I punctuated the kohen's question differently from the siddurim. They put the question mark after כדמחויבתא דאורייתא. I put it before, because both are options available from the Torah, implying that the first option is not in compliance with Torah law.

Note for those who question my sanity: For reasons known to people who know me (or, perhaps to people who pay attention to my blog and comments in other places), I can guarantee you that I will never have the opportunity to actually try it. :-)

Labels: halacha, humor, judaism

An area church had its time table out front on one of those ubiquitous boards with movable letters. The Sunday schedule was:
10:00AM BIBLE STUDY
11:00AM W RSHI

(I was going to take a picture of it, but it was corrected by the time I got a camera over there.)

Labels: humor, judaism

It's the week before Passover, making it time for the annual update on quinoa. And, so far, I haven't heard of any more bans. And, the pro-quinoa articles are all still on their originating websites; some include their original "check with your rabbi" disclaimers. Overall, this year, quinoa looks like it's safe from further kitniyotization.

Labels: halacha, judaism, kashrut, kitniyot, kosher, passover, yay

This post was inspired by a (friends-locked) post on another blog; I actually do want to know the answers to the questions, if anyone has any insight.

Has anyone ever been to a minyan in one of the following (or similar) situations?

A 10+10 minyan^* where there were 10 men present, fewer than 10 women present, and:

• someone had to say kaddish?
• the time for Shacharit was rapidly expiring?

What was done?⁰

Does anyone know of any halachic defense that has ever been put forward for a group to daven as if a minyan were not present^** in either of these situations?

An egalitarian minyan that followed the Golinkin or Wald teshuvot as their theory of egalitarianism, and a woman who followed the Roth teshuva and did not consider herself obligated was the tenth adult Jew in the room in time for a part of the service that required a minyan^***? Same questions.

By the way, the "minyan check" method proposed by BZ does not make some of these types of situations any less awkward if the person who has to say kaddish is one who thinks there's a minyan in the room.

[Update: Clarified what one of the questions means.]

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^* A "10+10 minyan" means one where it is agreed upon that the group waits for 10 men and 10 women before proceeding with davening as if there were a minyan. Note the confusing use of the word "minyan" to mean both "prayer community" and "quorum" in the same sentence.

⁰ I do actually have one answer from the other post, and, it was that the 10+10 minyan davened as if no minyan were present. What I found most interesting was that it was phrased in terms of the "halacha" of the community. (Posted by hotshot2000 as a comment to the private post and reposted here (thanks!), see comments.).

^** To the best of my knowledge, everyone in the room agrees that the requirement of a quorum for prayer is satisfied by the 10 men. In both of these cases, halacha contradicts the 10+10 principle.

^*** The not-obligated Roth teshuva adherent would not consider the room to have a minyan in it. The Golinkin/Wald teshuva-(only)-adherents may have no choice other than to consider her obligated. Does anyone know if any such group exists?

Labels: halacha, judaism, minyan, shul, synagogue

It wouldn't be Purim without the annual changes to the Purim kiddush. This year, there have been only minor changes to the text, and a number of changes to the document formatting. Mostly, these are attempts to make a closer parody of the evil empire of siddurim, emphasizing some of the bad typography choices they made (can someone explain to me why English is in italics?).

Here's the 2007 version in PDF (for viewing and printing) and OpenDocument format (for editing).

Beyond the more-or-less standard and interchangeable Roman fonts, the fonts used are: Ezra SIL for serif-Hebrew, and FreeSerif for the biohazard symbol dingbat used as a substitute for the 90-degree rotated fleur-de-lis.

If you're interested in liturgical development, the previous versions are: 2006, 2005, 2004.

Note that the copyright terms and permission notice for these two files are different from the rest of my blog. Here goes the legalese:
Copyright © 2004-2007 Elf's DH.

Permission is granted to make and distribute copies of this work, with or without modifications, under the conditions (1) that the above copyright notice and this permission notice are preserved on all copies and (2) that if the work is modified, distribution of the modified work is under the terms of an identical permission notice.

Chag Sameach!

[Edited to correct bad links to the 2007 edition. Sorry, forgot the http:// prefix]

Labels: humor, judaism, kiddush, purim

All prepped for Purim? It's not too early to start planning next year's Yom Kippur Party.

Labels: humor, judaism, oops

If you haven't been living in a cave for the past few days, you've probably encountered either a blog, a LiveJournal community, a mailing list, or a mainstream press article that referred to ShulShopper, a new website that launched whose goal is for congregations and independent minyanim of all (or no) denominations to self-list based on style and affiliation. Users can then search the site based on location and certain aspects of the minyanim that they're looking, and be matched to those that suit their preferences.

The basic idea is very good. It's still in public beta, so there are a number of kinks to be worked out in the backend and the interface, both of which are to be expected.

One of those kinks is the probably unexpected business of the site. The server is constantly choking under its load, and HTTP error 503 (service unavailable) is not an uncommon occurrence. In fact, it's been so busy in the first two days since its launch and has received so many links from so many sources that they've been affected by the blogosphere equivalent of the Slashdot effect. That is, an unintentional distributed denial of service attack caused by too many people trying to access the same site at the same time.

The moral: too much publicity can be a bad thing. I would expect that the DDOS will settle over the next few days as the site loses its brand-newness and becomes just another niche Internet service — or obtains more bandwidth. That, and, the blogosphere's attention span only goes so far (it's no more than 5 days).

UPDATE: What was it I said a week ago? Incidentally, the site is no longer DDOS-ed to the point of being nearly unusable, supporting my point about the blogosphere's attention span.

Labels: blogosphere, computers, internet, judaism, minyan, shul, synagogue

Now that:

• I've gotten at least 4 plugs,
• it's been revealed elsewhere that Studentville is a mock-up of an actual place,
• and my hit counter is running off the scale (by the way, the display counts visits, not page views),

I feel an obligation to post this.

The catch-phrase of the Ig Nobel Prizes is that they "first make people laugh, and then make them think." I would hope that post did it.

Pseudonymous commenter Locke (not the political philosopher) wrote:

I like to think of the two major groups of people that inhabit Studentville as crowd 1: which takes itself very seriously and won't laugh at anything. and crowd 2: who have a tendency to laugh much too loudly, and at inappropriate times.

You can think of this post as being written by crowd 2 with an audience of crowd 1.

And now, to the UAQ:

Oh no! My minyan was misrepresented!

Of course it was! It's a parody. Certain elements were exaggerated for effect and humor value.

But my minyan was misrepresented even more than all the others!

No, it wasn't. And, I would find it hard to believe that you did not recognize at least some elements of the (short) characterization that rang true.

Why would you write something inflammatory like this? The community is fine.

Read the comments to the original post. See if you still believe that.

Was it all a ploy to get people to go to a specific minyan?

No.

Was it directed as a jab any specific minyan?

Not really. The impetus for the post was a specific minyan. But, the point is valid for the entire community.

So, why did you say that my minyan had no reason to come into existence?

Because its founding duplicated an institution that's already in existence, rather than adding something new to communal life.

What do you mean by adding something new?

Creating a group with differences in practice and/or religious ideology sufficient to differentiate your group from the pre-existing ones.

Do you really think that Metropolis should only have three shuls -- one Reform, one Conservative, and one Orthodox?

That's two separate questions! The answer to the first is: No. If the active community is large enough to support duplicate institutions, or if geographical constraints make duplication necessary, it's not problematic at all. One can argue that the challenge in some communities is to make the religious groupings smaller. To the second question: Differences in practice and religious ideology are not limited to, and are more confused by than enlightened by, denominational lines.

But my minyan has social action, learning programs, etc.

That's great! Kol hakavod! Why do you need a minyan?

Are you on drugs?

No.

Do you hate independent minyanim?

No. I think independent minyanim have an important place in the greater Jewish community, and have done a lot to bring uninvolved Jews into the fold, and keep Jews involved. There's a time and place for everything, says Kohelet. Also, if you read the post, you'll note that independent minyanim are not the only targets of barbs.

Did the Republicans put you up to this?

No.

Why didn't you list my minyan?

Is it really in Studentville? If so, it means I didn't know about it. If you have to ask this question, though, you should probably be asking yourself where your minyan fits in to the "taxonomy."

What's a UAQ, anyway?

A FAQ is a frequently asked questions list. A UAQ is an unasked questions list. My telepathy software told me you were thinking them. :-)

Are you just writing this post to get back on everyone's RSS aggregators?

Shhh...

Labels: judaism, minyan, minyan proliferation, shul, studentville

... or, can't we all just daven together?

Important: If you lack a sense of humor, read this first.

Town stats:

Population: Approximately 100,000 (source: Wikipedia)
Number of kosher restaurants: 0
Number of kosher stores: 0
Number of mikvaot: 0
Jewish population: Unable to obtain statistics. I'd estimate somewhere in thousands. Like many places, most Jews do not go to shul. I would estimate the active Jewish population to be under 1000.
Number of minyanim: At least 14

Names changed to protect the guilty.

Hillel I^* Orthodox Minyan I.

Practice: Modern Orthodox
Reasons for existence: Orthodox undergraduate and graduate students from School I, Orthodox non-students who live in the area; Previously, only regularly-meeting Orthodox prayer group in town.
Served an unserved need when it started: Yes

Hillel I^* Orthodox Minyan II.

Practice: Modern Orthodox
Original reasons for existence: Orthodox undergraduate students who didn't want to daven with the non-students in Hillel I Orthodox Minyan I. (The original intent of the minyan was to meet on Shabbat. It never took off.)
Would have served an unserved need when it started: No
Current reason for existence: Weekday morning minyan an hour later.
Served an unserved need when it started: Yes

Hillel I^* Conservative Minyan I

Practice: Shortened-service, discussion session, Conservative/egalitarian
Original reasons for existence: Conservative students from School I; Conservative non-students
Current reasons for existence: Conservative non-students
Served an unserved need when it started: Yes

Hillel I^* Conservative Minyan II

Practice: Traditional-liturgy Conservative/egalitarian
Reasons for existence: Egalitarian-leaning Conservative students (mostly undergraduates) who didn't want to daven with Hillel I Orthodox Minyan I (yes, that's right. Conservative Minyan II was more a breakaway from Orthodox I than Conservative I!)
Served an unserved need when it started: Yes

Hillel I^* Reform Minyan

Practice: Guitar Reform
Reasons for existence: Only Reform prayer group in town.
Served an unserved need when it started: Yes

Hillel II^** Orthodox Minyan.

Practice: Orthodox
Reasons for existence: Orthodox students from School II.
Served an unserved need when it started: Yes

Hillel II^** Conservative Minyan.

Practice: Traditional-liturgy egalitarian/Conservative
Reasons for existence: Conservative/egalitarian students from School II.
Served an unserved need when it started: Yes

Orthodox Pseudo-Egalitarian Minyan I

Practice: Mechitza; Wait for 10 men/10 women for a "minyan"; Women lead parts of the service that aren't important.
Reasons for existence: Orthodox 20- and 30-somethings who wanted to maximize women's participation; Egalitarians who didn't want to daven at Shul Egalitarian Minyan or Hillel I Conservative Minyan II.
Served an unserved need before it started: Maybe. The real pseudo-egalitarian crowd was unserved. The (majority?) egalitarian crowd was served.

Orthodox Pseudo-Egalitarian Minyan II

Note: The latest addition to the fray.
Practice: Mechitza; Wait for 10 men/10 women for a "minyan"; Women lead parts of the service that aren't important. (Sound familiar?)
Reasons for existence: Undergraduate students who didn't want to daven with Orthodox Pseudo-Egalitarian Minyan I or Hillel I Orthodox Minyan I.
Served an unserved need before it started: No. Practice exactly mirrors Orthodox Pseudo-Egalitarian Minyan I.

Shul I Egalitarian Minyan

Practice: Traditional liturgy egalitarian/Conservative
Reasons for existence: Egalitarian-leaning Shul-I-goers who didn't want to daven with Shul I Traditional Minyan; Conservative area residents.
Served an unserved need before it started: Yes

Shul I Traditional Minyan

Original Practice: Orthodox, then non-egalitarian Conservative without a mechitza.
Original reasons for existence: It was the shul minyan.
Served an unserved need before it started: Yes
Current Practice: Modern Orthodox
Current reasons for existence: Members of Shul I who became "too frum" for Shul I Egalitarian Minyan; Orthodox area residents.
Served an unserved need before it started: Maybe

Postdenominational Egalitarian Minyan

Practice: Traditional-liturgy egalitarian/not Conservative
Reasons for existence: A place for 20- and 30-something egalitarians who go to Orthodox Pseudo-Egalitarian Minyan I to go when they don't meet; they won't go to Shul I Egalitarian Minyan or Hillel I Conservative Minyan II.
Served an unserved need before it started: No

Shul Nobody Goes To

Practice: Friday night egalitarian/"non-denominational" minyan
Original reasons for existence: Area residents who grew up in Hillel I forming a community.
Served an unserved need before it started: I dunno.
Current reasons for existence: Providing rental space for Postdenominational egalitarian minyan and Orthodox Pseudo-Egalitarian Minyan I. Getting Torah scrolls declared pasul (unfit) by said minyanim.

Big Orthodox Outreach Organization

Practice: Big Orthodox Outreach Organization
Reasons for existence: Feeding hungry students and non-students, especially of the bu$ine$$ and law varieties; Starting an hour later on Shabbat morning, thus avoiding any suspicion that Big Orthodox Outreach Organization rabbi is davening b'zman at Hillel I Orthodox Minyan I.
Served an unserved need before it started: Food, yes. Minyan, no.

---

^* It may come as a surprise to some who don't live in Studentville that I'm considering Hillel I as supporting minyanim for non-students. This is something of a historical accident. Hillel I is roughly centrally located in Studentville and functioned as something akin to a Jewish Community Center. At one point, it associated with local K-8 day school (now independent). With recent policy shifts added to the advent or ascendence of so many other minyanim, Hillel I is in the process of losing its connection to non-undergraduate students and non-students alike. When these changes begin to hit them significantly in the donation department has yet to be seen.

^** Geographical Note: School II is located far enough way from School I that they could not reasonably be expected to join each others' Hillels on a regular basis. Historical note: Both Hillel organizations were founded with a year of each other.

Updated: Added footnote *, corrected a few typos.
Update 2: Corrected characterization of one of the minyan's practices to reflect it "better." Added link to second post.

Labels: judaism, minyan, minyan proliferation, shul, studentville, synagogue

By now, I hope that I've shown that the Biblical prohibition in a halachic sense is not defined by the Biblical text itself. Now, I would like to examine the early rabbinic (primarily Talmudic) texts used by Dorff et al (2006), and Roth's responses (2006), interspersed with my own analysis.

Most of the discussion of Talmudic sources in Roth's 1992 teshuva focused on whether the rabbis of the Talmud could envision (and thus could have knowingly prohibited) the modern, monogamous, loving homosexual relationship. These sources, while they have halachic import, do more to establish social context than to determine the nature of the Biblical prohibition as a technical issue.

Dorff et al acknowledge that some form of homosexual behavior is not only Biblically prohibited, but is in the category of גילוי עריות (gilui arayot, illicit “uncoverings of nakedness”). Transgressing these prohibitions is considered so serious that one is halachically expected to die instead of submitting to a forced transgression of them.

Our analysis could begin in many places, but, perhaps the most appropriate is at BT Sanhedrin 55a:

א"ל רבינא לרבא: המערה בזכור מהו? המערה בזכור "משכבי אשה" כתיב ביה!

Ravina asked Rava: What are the illicit sexual relations concerning a man [and another man]? [Rava answered:] About that it is written: "The lyings of a woman!"

So, the Talmud defines the Biblically forbidden homosexual relations as whatever is legally included in the two verses in Leviticus. Based on their halachic analysis, Dorff et al interpret that to mean “anal intercourse”, and based on analysis of many of the same sources, Roth interprets it to mean all penetrative contact between men. In its discussion of the verses in question, the Talmud addresses three key points. The first is that the term “lyings of a woman” is not clear. The second is that it is written in plural. The third is that it is in a Biblical context dealing with other manners of forbidden sexual relations, such as between male and female relatives, between people and animals, and between men and menstruant women.

The plural “lyings of a woman” is addressed with the same Talmudic statement in three places, BT Sanhedrin 54a, BT Yevamot 56b, and Sifra Kedoshim 9:14 (92b):

“משכבי אשה” מגיד לך הכתוב ששני משכבות באשה. הרי זה בא ללמד ונמצא למד.

“The lyings of a woman” comes to teach us that there are two lyings with a woman. This passage comes to teach one thing, and it also teaches about another.

Rashi defines the two “lyings” as follows (emphasis added):

משכבי אשה - שתי משכבות יש באשה, שוין זה לזה לחייב בכל עריות, כדרכה ושלא כדרכה. הרי זה בא ללמד - על זכר, שחייב אפילו שלא כדרכה. ונמצא למד - למשכב זכור לא איצטריך קרא, דפשיטא לן דכל משכב זכר שלא כדרכו הוא, אלא האי משכבי לאשמועינן אתא דהבא על אשה, בין כדרכה, בין שלא כדרכה חייב.

“‘there are two lyings with a woman’ . . . that are equivalent to each other for legal liability with regards to all illicit sexual relations; the usual way [vaginal intercourse] and the unusual way. ‘This passage comes to teach one thing.’ That a man is liable [for illicit relations] even though they are done the unusual way. ‘and it also teaches us about another.’ For the purposes of homosexual relations, we don't need a Biblical verse, because clearly all relations between men are not performed the usual way. Instead, the verse comes to teach us that a man who has illicit sexual relations with a woman is liable, whether those relations were the usual way or the unusual way.”

The primary dispute here is the definition of “the unusual way.” Dorff et al argue that it means anal sex specifically, while Roth argues that it includes all nonvaginal penetrative intercourse. As a side note, this last Rashi undermines Dorff et al's note 29, where they write: “We are not aware of any rabbinic text which employs the term biah shelo kedarkah to describe homosexual sex.”

That sex the “unusual way” is sufficient to incur Biblical liability is made somewhat clearer from an unrelated discussion in Horayot 4a (brought up by Roth but not addressed in Dorff). The case the Talmud is discussing involves a sanhedrin (court) that makes an incorrect ruling. Ordinarily, this would make the court liable for having to bring a sacrifice, but anyone who followed the incorrect ruling would not be liable. The exception (mishna, Horayot 3b) is when the court annuls an entire Biblical law, for example, it removes the niddah prohibitions, the Sabbath, or the prohibitions against praying to foreign gods from the Torah in their entirety. In that case, the court is not liable to bring the sacrifice, and anyone who followed the ruling is liable for violating the “overturned” prohibition. The reasoning is that it should have been obvious (even to a Biblical literalist, such as a Sadducee) that the ruling was wrong, because it so obviously overreached the authority of the court.^* The mishna also presents a borderline case, in which the court annuls only a specific portion of a Biblical law. For example, it states that the niddah prohibitions are in force, but that a woman may consider herself pure (and thus have sexual relations with her husband) while she counts the days until her time of immersion; or that the Shabbat laws are in full force, except one may carry between a private domain and a public domain; or that the prohibitions against foreign worship are in full force, but one who merely bows before other gods is not liable. In these cases, when the court finds that it ruled incorrectly, it is liable for a sacrifice. When the Talmud discusses the first of these cases, it touches on issues relevant to our discussion. The Talmud is in the process of suggesting and rejecting what the court could have said in this case that was wrong, but not “obviously” Biblically prohibited. One of the suggestions is:

דאמרי: כדרכה אסירא, שלא כדרכה שריא, הא כתיב: "משכבי אשה."

[If] they say: the usual way is OK, the unusual way is forbidden, [they are answered: ] It is written: “the lyings of a woman”.

The conclusion is that it should be obvious that the phrase “the lyings of a woman” implies that both types of intercourse, the “usual” and “unusual” ways are Biblically forbidden.

The connection to the Biblical context is made in BT Yevamot 54b:

אמר ר' יונה, ואיתימא רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע: אמר קרא: "כי כל אשר יעשה מכל התועבות האלה ונכרתו הנפשות העושות" הוקשו כל העריות כולן לנדה. מה נדה בהעראה, אף כל בהעראה.

Rav Jonah said, and there are some who attribute it to Rav Huna son of Rav Joshua: The verse says: "All who do any of these abhorrences will have their souls cut off [from among their nation]" (Lev 18:29). All of the illicit sexual acts [listed in Leviticus 18] were connected to niddah. Just as for niddah, initiation of sexual contact [is sufficient for liability], so in all of them, initiation of sexual contact [is sufficient for liability].

The Talmud Yerushalmi, Kiddushin 1,1 (2a), is even more specific:

ר' יוסי בעא: הערייה בזכור מהו? הערייה בבהמה מה היא? וכל העריות לא מן הנידה למדו? זכור מינה, בהמה מינה.

R. Jose asked: What is the forbidden initiation of sexual contact between a man and another man? What is the forbidden initiation of sexual contact between a man and an animal? [He was answered:] Have we not learned about the forbidden sexual relations from the case of the menstruant woman? We learn the case of a man from there, and we learn the case of an animal from there.

This passage defines the Biblical injunction against the “lyings of a woman” with a man as the equivalent of what is forbidden with a menstruant woman. As far as I can tell, this source is not addressed in Dorff et al.

So, now, we know that העראה (I've been translating it as “initiation of sexual contact”) of ביאה שלא כדרכה (“sex the unusual way”) is sufficient to incur a Biblical penalty^**. Both of these remain undefined terms.

The Talmud defines העראה (initiation) in a discussion in Yevamot 55b as “הכנסת עטרה”, the entry of the crown of the penis. Both Roth (pp8-9) and Dorff (note 25) agree on this point. Their primary disagreement is into which orifice(s) the penis must be inserted in order to incur a Biblical penalty.

One Talmudic case considered strong proof by Dorff et al that “the unusual way” only refers to anal intercourse is that of the androginus, a human with two sets of genitalia. (Simplifying, ) The halachic definition of a male is one with a penis, so, the androginus is male according to halacha, and, thus can be liable for relations with another man. From BT Yevamot 83b:

אמר רב שמואל בר יהודה א"ר אבא אחוה דר' יהודה בר זבדי אמר רב יהודה אמר רב: אנדרוגינוס חייבין עליו סקילה משתי מקומות. מיתיבי: רבי אליעזר אמר אנדרוגינוס חייבין עליו סקילה כבזכר. בד"א בזכרות שלו, אבל בנקבות שלו, פטור. הוא דאמר כי האי תנא דתניא רבי סימאי אומר: אנדרוגינוס חייבין עליו סקילה משתי מקומות. מ"ט דרבי סימאי? אמר רבא בר המדורי: אסברא לי "ואת זכר לא תשכב משכבי אשה." אי זהו זכר שיש בו שני משכבות? הוי אומר: זה אנדרוגינוס. ורבנן אע"ג דאית ביה שני משכבות "את זכר" כתיב. ורבנן זכר גרידא מנא להו? מ"ואת אשה." באשה שלא כדרכה מנא להו? מ"אשה."

Rav Samuel son of Judah said in the name of Rabbi Aba brother of Rabbi Judah son of Zveidi who said in the name of Rabbi Judah who said in the name of Rav: An androginus is liable for [the Biblical penalty of] stoning [for homosexual relations] from two places. They asked of him [from the mishna]: “Rabbi Eliezer said: An androginus is liable for stoning as a man” — “As a man” means to say “with his maleness” (בזכרות שלו), but in his femaleness (בנקבות שלו), he is not liable!? This tannaitic ruling agrees with another [Beraita]: “Rabbi Simai said: An androginus is liable for stoning from two places.” Why does Rabbi Simai rule this way? Rava son of Hamduri said: Explain to me [the verse, Lev 18:22] “Do not lie with a man the lyings of a woman”. What man has two “lyings”? This is the androginus! The opinion of the [other] rabbis is that even though he has two “lyings”, it is written “And a man” [that is, he is only liable for sex with male parts (Rashi)]. [But] according to the opinion of the rabbis [where the word “a man” is being used to remove the liability from the female part of the androginus], from where do we derive the law [against homosexual relations] in relation to a normal male? From “and to a woman”^***. [According to both Rabbi Simai and the other rabbis, ] from where do we derive the law in relation to [illicit sexual relations between a man and woman] that the unusual way [is sufficient to incur a Biblical penalty? (We had thought that it was from the plural form of “lyings”, but this is already being used for different legal derivations -- Rashi)] From “a woman” (most likely referring to Lev. 18:22).

The ultimate ruling with regard to the androginus is unimportant for our purposes. Dorff et al would like “two places” to mean “two and only two”. There are a number of linguistic problems with the interpretation of this passage. One is pointed out by Roth (p12). “Femaleness” is universally equated with a vagina. The question then is the meaning of “maleness” in this context. Dorff et al equate it with an anus, following the Ritv"a (Rabbeinu Yom Tov ben Avraham Asevilli, 1255-1300; Dorff, note 31), who explicitly defines “maleness” as the “behind”. Roth prefers the term I translated as “maleness” to be understood according to its more frequent usage — “penis.” What Dorff's definition loses in linguistic fidelity, it gains in textual symmetry: the text refers to the two places an androginus can be penetrated and thus incur a penalty. The textual symmetry in Roth's definition is that both “maleness” and “femaleness” refer to genitalia. Either way, at least one “place” that is known to that author to result in a Biblical penalty is missing. For Dorff, it's the penis. For Roth, it's the anus (or the mouth, for that matter!). Both would argue based on their own versions of the textual parallelism that it is not expected to be there. This passage is therefore inconclusive.^****

Colloquially, “sex the unusual way” likely means any nonvaginal sex. Roth suggests that it means any nonvaginal penetration (for reasons discussed below). However, from the Talmudic sources alone, there is little evidence of its legal definition. It could be specifically anal, or it could be more general. In some places, it could have one meaning, and in others, it could be a specific euphemism. Other sources are introduced by both Roth and Dorff. But, they are similarly inconclusive.

There is later evidence as to the possible meanings of “sex the unnatural way”. Dorff et al suggest that the Rashi on the language used in the rape of Dinah (Gen 34:2) proves that “the unusual way” is painful, and therefore, it must refer to anal sex. Rashi derives this from the midrash Bereshit Rabba chapter 5. Once again, however, this is not absolute proof, since there is no evidence that the term has only one meaning. In that case, Rashi had one of many specific meanings of the “unusual way” in mind when he wrote the commentary on Genesis.

The closest we come to an actual definition is Rashi on Yevamot 34b:

שלא כדרכה והעראה משכבת זרע נפקא - שלא כדרכה אינו מקום זרע העראה לאו שכבת זרע הוא דאין כאן זרע הלכך תרוייהו משכבת זרע מימעטי:

The unusual way and initiation are differentiated [legally] from [the Biblical category of] “intercourse involving seed” - The unusual way [means] ‘not in a place with procreative potential’, and initiation of sexual contact is not [considered intercourse involving seed] because there is no ejaculation. Both are eliminated [from incurring legal liability] wherever [the Torah says] “intercourse involving seed”.

This would seem to support Roth's more general understanding of sex “the unusual way”.

Another cited proof text is the Rashi on Niddah 13b that defines another term, sex דרך אברים, “by way of the limbs”, which the Talmud explicity excludes from the category of “lyings of a woman”. Rashi defines:

דרך אברים - היינו שכבת זרע לבטלה, ואינו משכב זכור דבמשכב זכור כתיב: "משכבי אשה".

[Sex] by way of the limbs -- This [is a sexual act that] wastes seed, but it is not considered [the legal equivalent of] “lying with a man” because all of the cases for “lying with a man” must be included in “the lyings of a woman” (Lev 18:22).

Roth's interpretation is that “by way of the limbs” refers to nonpenetrative sex acts, and “the unnatural way” refers to penetrative sex acts. Dorff et al include only anal sex in “the unnatural way”, and the remainder in “by way of the limbs”.

The earliest quoted primary source of an absolutely clear broad legal definition is in an edition of the Shulchan Aruch published in Venice in 1594 (Roth p10). The Ram"a on Even Haezer 25:2 which reads: “And has intercourse with her the usual way or the unusual way, but not by way of the anus, God forbid”. The proof text itself (italicized), which clearly includes non-anal intercourse in “sex the unusual way” is not in our editions of the Ram"a. I don't know whether the Venice 1594 edition is a more or less reliable one than the one we have.

The later commentators and halachists include ever broader definitions of the Biblical prohibition (see Mainmonides, the Shulchan Aruch, Tur, etc. quoted by Roth p13), deriving the prohibition against intercourse from “the lyings of a woman”, and the prohibition against all other sexual activity from Lev. 18:3.

To this point, all that we've determined is that the early sources can be read such that anal intercourse is the only Biblical prohibition. It is a plausible reading, but, truthfully, not that conclusive nor convincing. Roth's understanding is most consistent with the greatest number of halachic texts, including the Talmud and post-Talmudic codes. To this point, the differentiation is all just an academic exercise. Even if the remainder is not Biblically prohibited, it is certainly Rabbinically prohibited. A future post will (hopefully) look at the logic used by Dorff et al to overturn the remaining prohibitions.

Roth provides a number of philosophical objections to defining the Biblical prohibition narrowly. The first, from a halachic perspective, is the principle ספיקא דאורייתא לחומרא, that when there is an uncertainty with regard to application of a Biblical law, we rule stringently. The counterargument would be that this is a cop-out. The uncertainty here is not (yet) in application, it is in whether the law is actually Biblical. To the best of my knowledge, this principle is a guideline for deciding practical applications, not for categorizing. The second objection is essentially a slippery-slope argument. Roth argues that should we decide to limit the Biblical prohibition against homosexuality, there is no reason not to do the same for all the other sexual prohibitions in Lev. 18. However, deciding on the nature of the Biblical prohibition does no such thing automatically. Rabbinic prohibitions still prevent one from making any forms of bestiality or incest halachically legitimate. The ultimate question is whether there is any compelling reason to reconsider the Rabbinic prohibitions. Dorff et al are not suggesting that Rabbinic halacha is nonbinding. On the contrary, much of their case relies on Rabbinic jurisprudence. Roth's third objection is more sociological. He argues there is a difference between what a decisor would say to someone privately and what should be enshrined in law for all to read. But, the fact that this issue has come up as a societal issue rather than as a private issue demands a societal answer.

^* A cynic would snicker at the parallels to the issue currently under discussion.

^** I want to make absolutely clear here that when a halachist talks about a liability for a Biblical or Rabbinic penalty, it is not equivalent to a statement that the halachist thinks that someone should actually go out and punish another according to that penalty. Penalties are being used to make legal distinctions. Nothing more.

^*** The text here is severely corrupted and it's a bit hard to tell which proof-verse is intended.

^**** I should point out that even though the language is inconclusive, if you're willing to accept Dorff et al's perfectly reasonable understanding at face value, this passage is pretty much the only one presented that would strongly indicate that the sole definition of “sex the unusual way” is anal sex. (Updated: 1/12/2007)

Many thanks to DW for helping me proofread and copy-edit.

Labels: conservative judaism, gay, halacha, homosexuality, judaism, lesbian, responsa, teshuva