Friday, April 04, 2008

Quinoa: the slow drift toward kitniyotization continues

Every year since 2005, I've been tracking the status of quinoa for Passover. I've been using the instructions on the Aish HaTorah website as a guide to when it would be considered kitniyot, on the theory that where that Chareidi kiruv organization goes, soon gets dragged down the Modern Orthodox world, then, whatever they said becomes "universal observant practice." This year, ADDeRabbi beat me to an update, adding in:
I’ve been informed that the Gedolim in Eretz Yisrael consider quinoa to be kitniyot. No surprise there.

Once again, I checked the trusty Aish "all about kitniyot" page. This year, it says:
There is one product called "quinoa" (pronounced "kin-O-ah," or keen-WA) that is the subject of much discussion. Although quinoa resembles a grain, it is technically in the "goose foot" family, which includes sugar beets and beet root. As such, some rabbis (for example, Rabbi Heinemann of Star-K) permit its use even for Ashkenazim on Passover, while other rabbis do not.

Compare that to the text I recorded in 2006. Notice a pattern? Does it conform to the process I described there?

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Sunday, February 24, 2008

The Partnership Minyan Gabbai Guide

It's well known to readers of this blog that my feelings about partnership minyanim (aka, 10+10's) are ambivalent. On the one hand, they are progressive from the Orthodox feminist perspective, in that they allow women some public role in the service. It appears to me that the partnership minyan has quickly been replacing the womens' tefillah group as the preferred way for women to participate in an Orthodox-style service. The partnership minyan may be contrasted with womens' tefillah groups, which have some characteristics that resemble communal prayer, but always seemed (to me, anyway, having never attended one for the obvious reason) as a kind of play-service, where it is made known (through liturgical changes and omissions) to everyone in attendance that none of the additional parts of the service that look like the activities reserved for a minyan really “count” the way they would have had a minyan of men been present. The partnership minyan, on the other hand, is a “real” service, and, in most cases (see below), where women are allowed to do something, what they do “counts” equally. On the other hand, from the perspective of a full-egalitarian, they are regressive, in that women are only allowed to lead parts of the service which are less important (see below for more about that characterization). Perhaps some of my ambivalence is in seeing these minyanim attract people who might otherwise daven in a fully egalitarian style, where womens' position really is (for the most part) considered equal to mens', whereas the partnership minyan still leaves women in an awkward communal position.

Our local partnership minyan linked to the Guide for the 'Halachic Minyan', effectively, a guide for the gabbaim of partnership minyanim to determine what parts of the service they decided women can definitely lead. The guide also gives a brief description of the rationale behind the movement and behind its halachic methodology. The basic assumptions of the partnership minyan, as expressed or implied by the guide, are that women are obligated in prayer (that is, they may pray any time they want), not obligated in specific prayers, nor are they obligated in the separate mitzvah of communal prayer, nor any other time-bound positive commandments. These are absolute constraints, and women cannot accept them upon themselves and become equally obligated. The goal of the enterprise is to maximize womens' participation under these traditional constraints, resulting in a wholly non-traditional form of congregational prayer.

The guide consciously expresses what women can lead in the positive, and is careful not to say “a woman does not lead” any part of the service. Instead, it expresses the same idea as “a man takes over at ...”, describing a practice instead of prescribing halacha. The guide leaves open the idea that increased permission may be discovered at some future time. The guide seeks to rely only on the direct and plain meaning of the halachic literature it uses as its sources, and only uses sources which explicitly permit women to perform the ritual function in question, without making any logical inferences or any original innovations (with respect to halachic issues, but not with respect to stylistic ones). Minority opinions in the literature may be relied upon, even if they contradict traditional practice. In that way, the guide functions as a sort of clearinghouse of permissive rulings in the literature on the issue of womens' participation. The rejection of innovation of new halacha is perhaps the abstract concept that separates the bases of partnership minyanim from fully egalitarian minyanim.

The abstract conception of the position of a woman in the community is also a primary difference. This can be demonstrated by the guide's answer to a question I brought up in a previous post. Namely, what should be done when 10 men are present and fewer than 10 women are present. In comments on that post, most defenders of the partnership minyan movement said that the group should wait or continue to daven as if no minyan were present (even though all agree that a halachic minyan is present in the room). A few indicated that they had seen such a practice followed. That position struck me as strange, given that the group is already making an assumption that communal prayer is a separate obligation from prayer itself. The guide instructs as follows:
Whenever a minyan is required, it is common practice, to wait for 10 men and 10 women to start pray[sic] (as long as the time of tefilla [Zman Tefilla] has not passed) besides when women are counted for a minyan such as in the case of megilah reading on Purim. (emph added)

As I argued in my previous post and its comments, the function of the 10 women is to hold up an already-present halachically-valid minyan of 10 men, not to contribute positively toward a minyan of 20. The 10+10 custom is acknowledged to be secondary to the halacha, a position that is fully consistent with the current assumptions of the movement. It does, however, support the conception that the function of women in a 10+10 is subtractive, not additive.

The idea that men are given primacy over women, even for things they are otherwise allowed to do is still present, at least in some congregations (eg, in the divisions of aliyot — “some congregations reserve a majority of aliyot for men” on the basis of Rema OH 282:3). A similar note indicates that some congregations reserve the first two aliyot for men when a kohen or levi is not present. (If the kohen/levi precedence for the first two aliyot is considered to be a purely historical artifact, then only men would take the first two aliyot, even in a fully egalitarian minyan.) The movement, although it has gone a long way [over traditional Orthodox practice] in allowing limited womens' participation, has not completely abandoned the idea that womens' participation in prayer services is a denigration of the honor of the congregation. By citing these halachic sources, the movement implies that women are, at best, ancillary members of the congregation (which is traditionally defined as the men only).

I often characterize the services at partnership minyanim as ones where “women do things that aren't important.” The guide divides the service into three categories. The first category is that of parts of the service that women can lead — those that may be left out of the service, or may be led even by a child. The other two types are parts in which womens' participation may be considered problematic or is apparently barred. The methodology used for approaching the second and third categories is a bit more instructive than the first. Where sources are found for womens' obligation (such as Hallel on the first night of Passover), they are allowed to participate equally. Another method used for finding room for womens' participation, where it is deemed possible, is to find halachic opinions that reduce the level of obligation associated with the particular prayer such that it no longer has communal importance. An alternative approach is used for Hallel on Festivals, in which it states that the leader need not fulfill the congregation's obligations.1 Parts of the service containing devarim sh'biqedusha are (as of now) non-negotiably led entirely by men. Some partnership minyanim have adopted the practice of assigning any part of the service (excluding the Torah reading) that can be led by women to a woman. This essentially divides the entire service leadership on the basis of gender. In a sense, it is inclusive, but counter-egalitarian.

The partnership minyan movement also calls itself “halachic egalitarian” (a term full egalitarians do and should consider objectionable). The guide goes through considerable trouble to defend the use of the term:
This guide does not refer to parts of the tefillah that are categorized as devarin shbiqdusha, in which the chazzan fulfills the congregation's obligation. It is not our intention to claim that communities in which women lead these parts of the prayer are not halachically justifiable. ...
In conclusion, a word about the name “halachic minyan.” The congregations for which this guide is intended have been described by many names. From among them this name has been chosen as it is meant to describe the essence of the process by which the practices of these congregations are determined and the nature of their connection to the tradition of halachic decision making. Halachah is the basis upon which we stand. With the chosen name we mean to convey that, despite our departure from traditional practice to include women, we may only innovate as far as the Halachah, as recorded in the writings of traditional decisors, permits. The name thus functions descriptively, not contrastively. We do not at all mean implicitly to denigrate other practices and movements as non-halachic.

It is difficult to parse out an entirely positive interpretation of the name, without it being a comparative term. Did not the movement which calls itself “traditional egalitarian” jump through hoops to justify their practice within halacha (albeit under a moderately different set of halachic assumptions)? The guide leaves open that it is not a final answer to the question of womens' participation, and that further progress innovation allowances may be made discovered in the future. Both movements essentially started with a goal and trawled the literature for their defenses. Both accept that minority opinions in the literature may be relied upon, and may even overturn traditional practice.

1 I once attended an Orthodox service on a Festival night following Shabbat at a college Hillel, where the custom in the Hillel's dining hall was for a woman to make kiddush at the meal, and for a man to lead birkat hamazon. (This was clearly a concession to the Orthodox minyan which did not want women leading birkat hamazon). The Orthodox minyan held that a woman could not fulfill the congregation's obligation (the partnership minyan gabbai guide says that they may). The gabbai of the minyan made an announcement after services, which essentially said that the kiddush and havdalah that would be made later by a woman would not fulfill everyone's obligation and that they should all say it for themselves. Had I been the woman making kiddush, I would have found that announcement mildly insulting, even though I could fully appreciate the halachic basis. I would hope that the partnership minyan could handle this issue more tactfully.

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Thursday, January 31, 2008

In defense of one oven

One friend (who will remain nameless to protect the guilty) made the claim that our kitchen is not kosher because we use one oven for milk and meat. Not that it was not in accordance with her stricture. But, that it was not kosher.1. I went ahead and made the claim that the idea that one needed a separate milk and meat oven is one of the piled-on modern chumrot. I underestimated the amount of time that it took to enter halacha. I originally put it at about 40 years (see below), but it turns out that the theory can be traced to a longer-running dispute that I'm not sure how much significance it had for practical halacha.

The Internet has some very good resources. 2

As you can see from the sources (I won't repeat the details, if you want them, see the links above), the primary problem that is discussed in the literature until the Rema (16th century) is cooking kosher and non-kosher in the same oven simultaneously. The Rema inserts that milk and meat and kosher/non-kosher have the same laws, and that consecutive use under the same covering might be problematic because the steam (not the "aroma," which is essentially halachic cooties) from one food might change the status of the other. The ensuing halachic debate revolves around how steam transfers food-gender. Does it only work directly (from one steamy pot to another above it)? Does it work indirectly (from one steaming pot to anything else in the same enclosed atmosphere)? Does it work through enclosures? Does steam embed in the oven? Do all hot things produce steam with the same halachic status?

It also appears that "steam" the Rema is worried about is an actual physical entity, not halachic cooties. It is directly analogized to the condensation that appears on a pot cover. Note also that this explains the Rosh's (13th century)3 seemingly paradoxical conclusion that steam doesn't affect hot pots, where one would ordinarily expect that heat would worsen the transfer: water doesn't condense above its boiling point.

Our approach is never to cook or heat milk and meat in the same oven at the same time, and to allow the oven to cool down before switching genders. It is cleaned if recognizable food particles are present. In practice, it is an implementation of the Aruch Hashulchan's position, but, in theory, it's somewhere between those of the Aruch Hashulchan and Lichtenstein/Feinstein's. The added chumra is that even if the steam from consecutive use is important, we are worried about an actual physical entity. The actual steam from food is evacuated when the door to the oven is opened to remove the food (and the air inside exchanges with the air outside), and that if anything recognizable condenses during the cool-down cycle, it can be cleaned.

As noted in Rabbi Mordechai Broyde's article, the Aruch Hashulchan's position "was the custom in Eastern Europe a century ago."

In fact, three of the four practices with halachic-literature bases ((1) use the same [clean] oven for both, but not at the same time (2) use the same [clean] oven for both, with a 24 hour waiting period OR one hour at maximum temperature in between, (3) use the same [clean] oven for both, covering either dairy or meat liquids,4 (4) not using the same oven for both unless one is double-wrapped) allow the same oven to be used for milk and meat, with only the procedure for their use varying.

The practical implication is that it's possible to have a fully functional and fully kosher kitchen without being super-wealthy. That is, until the chumra police make you need a second oven.


1 Actually, she compared eating at our house to "eating out" (in the Jewishism sense), and effectively treats food we cook as treif. It was later modified to a "lower level transgression" instead of actual treifness.

2 For other resources, one wonders if they deliberately archaize the text ("a housewife should...") in order to sound more "traditional" or "authentic," or if the writers really live in a hole.

3 But didn't I say that this problem isn't discussed until the 16th century? Indeed, I did. The problem the Rosh is discussing is steam emitted directly onto another pot. The question of import here is whether steam that is emitted, condensed, and re-emitted is significant.

4 Reading about this subject has made me wonder whether popular misunderstanding of Rav Moshe Feinstein's position (or the other variants of it) contributes to the idea that one needs two separate ovens. It does require that one designate an oven as "meat" or "dairy" and pareve items that are cooked in it uncovered are considered to have the status of "meat equipment" or "dairy equipment." Yet, still a "meat" oven can be used to cook covered dairy liquids or uncovered dairy solids. Does the concept of designation itself lead people toward acceptance of the strictest opinion?

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Friday, January 11, 2008

Hartman rabbinic ordination of women: not such a big deal

This J-Post article is setting the blogosphere abuzz about Rabbi David Hartman's decision to offer Orthodox rabbinic ordination to women at the Shalom Hartman Institute. The popular press rhetoric is certainly the rhetoric of egalitarianism. Rabbi Donniel Hartman, co-director of the institute and son of David Hartman, is quoted as saying:
"The classic distinctions between men and women are no longer relevant. People who come to the Hartman Institute to study are committed to making gender equality in Judaism a reality."

Now, here's the description of the program:

Melamdim also offers an optional Rabbi-Educator track – the first rabbinic ordination program of its kind. Tailored to the distinct professional needs of rabbis who serve as North American community high school educators, the track is open to students of both sexes and all denominations who are interested in pursuing an MA degree, teaching career and rabbinic ordination at the same time.
Target Population
The program is open to individuals of all denominations from Israel and North America, who satisfy the following criteria:

  • Hold a BA either in Jewish studies or in Bible, Talmud or Jewish Philosophy

  • Have a good knowledge of Hebrew

  • Have a knowledge of classical Jewish texts

  • Commit to fulfill the program’s considerable study and work requirements

  • Commit to work as a teacher in a Jewish high school for at least three years after graduating from the program




It looks like it's offering the status of rav hamaggid, the lowest level of ordination which entitles the bearer to hold the title of "rabbi" and to teach. It does not confer the status of halachic decisor. It does not automatically allow one to perform the functions commonly associated with pulpit rabbis (which was the focus of the Conservative teshuvot in the 1970's and 1980's). One can argue that this status is not an equivalent of nor a modern replacement for "traditional" (Talmudic?) rabbinic ordination.

In Modern Orthodox circles, many high schools already allow women to be taught Talmud, a few more allow women to teach Talmud to men. Most already have women teaching some subjects, implying that they do not consider teaching high school to be serara (holding a position of communal authority), so, they do not have to face that halachic boundary. Judaic studies teachers who hold the title of "rabbi" are probably paid at a higher level for their advanced degree, which is a path toward career advancement previously not open to women. If a high school were to accept Hartman's ordination of a woman, they may then be forced to pay her at an equal rate to men who hold the same type of degree.

Even so, women who graduate from the program would have a second-class status, even as a rav hamaggid. They could function as high school teachers (the intent of the training in the program), but they could not function as pulpit rabbis, the other career path for a rav hamaggid, because their activities are still restricted by Orthodox interpretations of halacha.

In sum, this may affect teachers' pay and titles (and we aren't even sure if the title "rabbi" will be conferred on a woman), but it doesn't look like there's anything truly ground-breaking coming out of it.

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Sunday, August 12, 2007

Has anyone ever done this?

In a moment of boredom in shul, I was looking at the text of the Pidyon Haben ceremony (in a Birnbaum Ashkenazic siddur, it's about the same in the Artscroll).

The kohen says:
מאי בעית טפי -- ליתן לי בנך בכורך שהוא פטר רחם לאמו? או בעית לפדותו בעד חמש סלעים? כדמחויבתא דאורייתא
What would you like to do: do you choose to give me your firstborn son who opened the womb of his mother? or do you choose to redeem him for five selaim? as you are required from the Torah.

According to the standard text, the father answers:
חפץ אני לפדות את בני והילך דמי פדיונו כדמחויבתי דאורייתא
I choose to redeem my son, and here is the worth of his redemption that is required of me by the Torah.

But, what if he answers:
חפץ אני ליתן לך את בני והילך בני כדמחויבתי דאורייתא
I choose to give you my son, and here is the my son as required of me by the Torah.

Textual note: I punctuated the kohen's question differently from the siddurim. They put the question mark after כדמחויבתא דאורייתא. I put it before, because both are options available from the Torah, implying that the first option is not in compliance with Torah law.

Note for those who question my sanity: For reasons known to people who know me (or, perhaps to people who pay attention to my blog and comments in other places), I can guarantee you that I will never have the opportunity to actually try it. :-)

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Monday, March 26, 2007

No news is good news

It's the week before Passover, making it time for the annual update on quinoa. And, so far, I haven't heard of any more bans. And, the pro-quinoa articles are all still on their originating websites; some include their original "check with your rabbi" disclaimers. Overall, this year, quinoa looks like it's safe from further kitniyotization.

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Monday, March 12, 2007

Awkward Minyan Situations

This post was inspired by a (friends-locked) post on another blog; I actually do want to know the answers to the questions, if anyone has any insight.

Has anyone ever been to a minyan in one of the following (or similar) situations?

A 10+10 minyan* where there were 10 men present, fewer than 10 women present, and:

What was done?0

Does anyone know of any halachic defense that has ever been put forward for a group to daven as if a minyan were not present** in either of these situations?

An egalitarian minyan that followed the Golinkin or Wald teshuvot as their theory of egalitarianism, and a woman who followed the Roth teshuva and did not consider herself obligated was the tenth adult Jew in the room in time for a part of the service that required a minyan***? Same questions.

By the way, the "minyan check" method proposed by BZ does not make some of these types of situations any less awkward if the person who has to say kaddish is one who thinks there's a minyan in the room.

[Update: Clarified what one of the questions means.]


* A "10+10 minyan" means one where it is agreed upon that the group waits for 10 men and 10 women before proceeding with davening as if there were a minyan. Note the confusing use of the word "minyan" to mean both "prayer community" and "quorum" in the same sentence.

0 I do actually have one answer from the other post, and, it was that the 10+10 minyan davened as if no minyan were present. What I found most interesting was that it was phrased in terms of the "halacha" of the community. (Posted by hotshot2000 as a comment to the private post and reposted here (thanks!), see comments.).

** To the best of my knowledge, everyone in the room agrees that the requirement of a quorum for prayer is satisfied by the 10 men. In both of these cases, halacha contradicts the 10+10 principle.

*** The not-obligated Roth teshuva adherent would not consider the room to have a minyan in it. The Golinkin/Wald teshuva-(only)-adherents may have no choice other than to consider her obligated. Does anyone know if any such group exists?

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Sunday, February 11, 2007

Homosexuality in halacha V: Human Dignity

For the purposes of this post, I will assume that we can accept the Dorff, Nevins, Reisner teshuva's conclusion that among all homosexual activity, only male-on-male anal intercourse is forbidden from the Torah, and the remainder is forbidden rabbinically.*

Please note that we are discussing here a legal, not a colloquial, definition of “dignity.” An answer that says that the principle does not apply to the case of homosexuality is not equivalent to saying that homosexuals are somehow undignified or not due the honor that is due to any human being.

Dorff et al begin their argument on the concept of “feasibility” — that the halacha does not demand what it knows to be impossible. Upon first reading this argument, I equated it in my mind with Rabbi Simchah Roth's final argument in his teshuva that homosexuals are אנוסים (compelled in their actions). The Dorff teshuva never makes the equation to that legal language. It uses more fuzzy broad-based logic to argue that the Torah does not demand the impossible (pp13-14). Both arguments are similar in that both documents use this particular argument towards the end of increased permissiveness, which looks to me like the wrong conclusion. A more authentic use might be to use these types of arguments to absolve homosexuals of the positive obligations of heterosexual marriage. Another potential use would be to absolve them of legal culpability for wrongdoing. Because the halacha is not a civil code, removal of such culpability has no practical effect. It also may be counterproductive to the final intent of the argument. It appears to me that Dorff et al intend to make halacha accepting of homosexuals in an ideal way (לכתכילה), not merely as compelled sinners. It does not appear to me that these arguments help overturn negative commandments in anything more than a single-instance and/or non-ideal case (בדיעבד).

The primary halachic argument that Dorff et al advance, and the one from which they derived the title of their work is that כבוד הבריות (human dignity, dignity due to all creations) overrides the Rabbinic negative commandments, and would thus allow homosexuals full participation in the community.

The principle, as stated in the Talmud (see footnote 56 for multiple references), is גדול כבוד הבריות שדוחה לא תעשה שבתורה, “[so] great is human dignity that it sets aside a negative commandment in the Torah.” All agree that the Talmud limits its own statement to Rabbinic commandments. That is why one must agree with this teshuva's interpretation of the the distinction between Biblical and Rabbinic prohibitions that was summarized earlier in order for this particular argument to hold.

The analysis then turns to practical cases where the principle is used:
  1. BT Berachot 19b: A sage must strip off a garment that he learns contains a prohibited combination (shatnez), even if he is in public. In this case, Divine dignity, which is determined by observance of the commandments, overrides human dignity and the dignity due to the sage.
  2. A kohen may accompany a mourner through a field that was rendered impure through the possible presence of human remains. Had the field been an actual cemetery, this act would be Biblically forbidden. The prohibition of a kohen's passage through the uncertain field is Rabbinic, and is overridden by the dignity due to the mourner.
  3. Similarly, the rabbis, including kohanim would go over actual coffins in order to greet a king of Israel. The dignity due to the king overrides what turns out to be a rabbinic commandment (because the coffins themselves were constructed to limit the spread of impure cooties).
  4. Because leading an animal would be beneath his dignity, a Torah scholar does not have to return a lost animal he found, in contravention to a positive Biblical commandment.
  5. A person may carry smooth stones (an equivalent to toilet paper) up to a roof -based bathroom on Shabbat in order to clean himself, in deference to human dignity. Such carrying would violate a negative Rabbinic commandment.
  6. A dead body may be removed from a house to an intermediate area on Shabbat. Such carrying would violate a negative Rabbinic commandment.
  7. One should bury an abandoned body in preference to reading the Megilah at the proper time, because of the dignity due to the body (this is indeed referred to in B.T. Megilah 3b as כבוד הבריות, the dignity due to creations, and not the more common כבוד המת, the dignity due to the dead).


The opposing arguments are (Roth 2006 p21-26):
  1. Person A may violate a negative rabbinic commandment on behalf of the dignity of person B, but not on behalf of his own dignity.
  2. In order to qualify as indignity, the undignified state must occur in public.
  3. The dignity exception only applies to violations that occur in single-instances, and is an emergency measure.


In fact, most of the cited cases do follow one of these patterns, and Dorff et al acknowledge that fact (p23). R. Louis Ginzberg's modern definition that they cite of כבוד הבריות, in fact, comes somewhere between Roth's and their own:

שכבוד הבריות משמעו דבר שאדם מונע עצמו ממנו כדי שלא יתבזה בין בני אדם

The meaning of [the exception due to] human dignity is that a man withholds himself from something so that he will not be humiliated among people. (Dorff translation, p23)


This definition seems to allow for someone to make an exception on his own behalf, but also indicates that the indignity must occur in public.

It appears to me that the only case of those provided where an individual is clearly violating a negative Rabbinic commandment on behalf of his own dignity is that of the carrying of cleaning stones on Shabbat. Roth's first and second counterarguments are applied to this case by asserting that the prevented indignity is the smell of feces among others. The dignity of the others is being protected, and the indignity occurs in public. This line of thought can be negated by pointing out that there is no mention of others in the private domain. One could easily imagine that the man be advised not to violate Shabbat and not to appear in public, or that the exception be limited to a multi-occupant house! Unfortunately, Dorff et al seemingly contradict themselves on the bottom of p23: “Dignity is a social phenomenon... for a person to smell filthy in isolation is uncomfortable, but it becomes humiliating only when others smell him.” Roth's third counterargument that it is only a single-instance emergency measure is negated by the fact that this exception is codified in the Shulchan Aruch as a permanent exception.**

In defense of the argument that this ruling applies to homosexuals, Dorff et al assert that homosexuals' “social status is one of humiliation” (p22). One thing in common between all the precedent proof-cases provided both by Dorff et al and by Roth (who includes additional cases in his refutation) is that it is perfectly clear that a specific commandment is being violated by one person on behalf of the dignity of a specific person. The major legal issue with the exception proposed by Dorff et al is that the permission is highly nonspecific. It is never clear who's dignity is being protected in the particular violation of any rabbinic commandment. The “hard” legal principle from which they tried to derive a hard legal argument devolved into a “soft” principle, to use their own terminology (p17).

The teshuva also suffers from a philosophical flaw that is inherent to other permissive Conservative teshuvot as well. Namely, it speaks the language of permission, but not of obligation.*** In this case, the teshuva concludes that all rabbinic prohibitions relating to homosexuality are annulled because of the principle of “so great is human dignity...”. It also emphasizes Jewish values such as fidelity/monogamy, (p27) but it does not translate these values into part of the proposed solution. It intentionally leaves out discussion of the nature of “commitment ceremonies”, allowing them, but effectively making them optional (p25). It appears that the teshuva leaves fewer obligations with regards to a homosexual relationship than a heterosexual one!

Unlike R. Gordon Tucker's teshuva (for example), the work of Rabbis Dorff, Nevins, and Reisner is intended to be a paper for an audience willing to accept classical halachic reasoning. Because it relies on essentially weak or incomplete argumentation, it would tend to fail to convince that kind of audience. As far as I have read, though, it is the most plausible attempt to create a permissive regime for homosexuality within the context of halacha. An unfortunate side-effect of its acceptance by the CJLS may be that it will be considered the final word on the subject, and a more halachically honest approach will never even be proposed. As a side note, the Masorti movement, the Israeli equivalent of the Conservative movement, which retains its own decision-making apparatus, has stated that it will not be bound by the American decision. It is possible, therefore, that these issues will be ironed out in the Israeli/overseas process.



* In my previous post, I decided not to discuss the issue of lesbianism. Briefly, Roth (1992,pp5-6;2006,pp18-19) claims that it's Biblically prohibited, quoting from Sifra, which derives the prohibition from the general introductory statement of Lev. 18:3. Both Roth and Dorff et al agree that any punishment for lesbianism is rabbinic. Should we accept Dorff's argument about the Biblical prohibitions with regard to men, then, it would only seem logical to accept their arguments with respect to women. Otherwise, lesbianism, which does not involve any intercourse and is not mentioned specifically in the Torah, would be under a more stringent ruling than male homosexuality, which involves intercourse that is forbidden by the Torah. It is not clear from the Sifra's text itself whether it actually intended to derive a new Biblical prohibition or make a midrashic comment, or, for that matter, what acts precisely would be considered Biblically prohibited.

** Dorff et al attempt to provide a grammatical argument from the Talmudic text of the case of the Israelite king to prove that the human dignity exception is continuous, and not an emergency measure. The argument is not that convincing.

*** We may contrast this teshuva to those that permitted egalitarianism, which based their conclusions on two theories. According to one theory (Roth), women must accept upon themselves obligations before they could fulfil them for others. According to the other theory (Golinkin, eg), women are already, in fact, equally obligated.

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Wednesday, January 10, 2007

Homosexuality in halacha IV: The Biblical Prohibition

By now, I hope that I've shown that the Biblical prohibition in a halachic sense is not defined by the Biblical text itself. Now, I would like to examine the early rabbinic (primarily Talmudic) texts used by Dorff et al (2006), and Roth's responses (2006), interspersed with my own analysis.

Most of the discussion of Talmudic sources in Roth's 1992 teshuva focused on whether the rabbis of the Talmud could envision (and thus could have knowingly prohibited) the modern, monogamous, loving homosexual relationship. These sources, while they have halachic import, do more to establish social context than to determine the nature of the Biblical prohibition as a technical issue.

Dorff et al acknowledge that some form of homosexual behavior is not only Biblically prohibited, but is in the category of גילוי עריות (gilui arayot, illicit “uncoverings of nakedness”). Transgressing these prohibitions is considered so serious that one is halachically expected to die instead of submitting to a forced transgression of them.

Our analysis could begin in many places, but, perhaps the most appropriate is at BT Sanhedrin 55a:

א"ל רבינא לרבא: המערה בזכור מהו? המערה בזכור "משכבי אשה" כתיב ביה!

Ravina asked Rava: What are the illicit sexual relations concerning a man [and another man]? [Rava answered:] About that it is written: "The lyings of a woman!"



So, the Talmud defines the Biblically forbidden homosexual relations as whatever is legally included in the two verses in Leviticus. Based on their halachic analysis, Dorff et al interpret that to mean “anal intercourse”, and based on analysis of many of the same sources, Roth interprets it to mean all penetrative contact between men. In its discussion of the verses in question, the Talmud addresses three key points. The first is that the term “lyings of a woman” is not clear. The second is that it is written in plural. The third is that it is in a Biblical context dealing with other manners of forbidden sexual relations, such as between male and female relatives, between people and animals, and between men and menstruant women.

The plural “lyings of a woman” is addressed with the same Talmudic statement in three places, BT Sanhedrin 54a, BT Yevamot 56b, and Sifra Kedoshim 9:14 (92b):

“משכבי אשה” מגיד לך הכתוב ששני משכבות באשה. הרי זה בא ללמד ונמצא למד.

“The lyings of a woman” comes to teach us that there are two lyings with a woman. This passage comes to teach one thing, and it also teaches about another.


Rashi defines the two “lyings” as follows (emphasis added):

משכבי אשה - שתי משכבות יש באשה, שוין זה לזה לחייב בכל עריות, כדרכה ושלא כדרכה. הרי זה בא ללמד - על זכר, שחייב אפילו שלא כדרכה. ונמצא למד - למשכב זכור לא איצטריך קרא, דפשיטא לן דכל משכב זכר שלא כדרכו הוא, אלא האי משכבי לאשמועינן אתא דהבא על אשה, בין כדרכה, בין שלא כדרכה חייב.

“‘there are two lyings with a woman’ . . . that are equivalent to each other for legal liability with regards to all illicit sexual relations; the usual way [vaginal intercourse] and the unusual way. ‘This passage comes to teach one thing.’ That a man is liable [for illicit relations] even though they are done the unusual way. ‘and it also teaches us about another.’ For the purposes of homosexual relations, we don't need a Biblical verse, because clearly all relations between men are not performed the usual way. Instead, the verse comes to teach us that a man who has illicit sexual relations with a woman is liable, whether those relations were the usual way or the unusual way.”


The primary dispute here is the definition of “the unusual way.” Dorff et al argue that it means anal sex specifically, while Roth argues that it includes all nonvaginal penetrative intercourse. As a side note, this last Rashi undermines Dorff et al's note 29, where they write: “We are not aware of any rabbinic text which employs the term biah shelo kedarkah to describe homosexual sex.”

That sex the “unusual way” is sufficient to incur Biblical liability is made somewhat clearer from an unrelated discussion in Horayot 4a (brought up by Roth but not addressed in Dorff). The case the Talmud is discussing involves a sanhedrin (court) that makes an incorrect ruling. Ordinarily, this would make the court liable for having to bring a sacrifice, but anyone who followed the incorrect ruling would not be liable. The exception (mishna, Horayot 3b) is when the court annuls an entire Biblical law, for example, it removes the niddah prohibitions, the Sabbath, or the prohibitions against praying to foreign gods from the Torah in their entirety. In that case, the court is not liable to bring the sacrifice, and anyone who followed the ruling is liable for violating the “overturned” prohibition. The reasoning is that it should have been obvious (even to a Biblical literalist, such as a Sadducee) that the ruling was wrong, because it so obviously overreached the authority of the court.* The mishna also presents a borderline case, in which the court annuls only a specific portion of a Biblical law. For example, it states that the niddah prohibitions are in force, but that a woman may consider herself pure (and thus have sexual relations with her husband) while she counts the days until her time of immersion; or that the Shabbat laws are in full force, except one may carry between a private domain and a public domain; or that the prohibitions against foreign worship are in full force, but one who merely bows before other gods is not liable. In these cases, when the court finds that it ruled incorrectly, it is liable for a sacrifice. When the Talmud discusses the first of these cases, it touches on issues relevant to our discussion. The Talmud is in the process of suggesting and rejecting what the court could have said in this case that was wrong, but not “obviously” Biblically prohibited. One of the suggestions is:

דאמרי: כדרכה אסירא, שלא כדרכה שריא, הא כתיב: "משכבי אשה."

[If] they say: the usual way is OK, the unusual way is forbidden, [they are answered: ] It is written: “the lyings of a woman”.


The conclusion is that it should be obvious that the phrase “the lyings of a woman” implies that both types of intercourse, the “usual” and “unusual” ways are Biblically forbidden.

The connection to the Biblical context is made in BT Yevamot 54b:

אמר ר' יונה, ואיתימא רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע: אמר קרא: "כי כל אשר יעשה מכל התועבות האלה ונכרתו הנפשות העושות" הוקשו כל העריות כולן לנדה. מה נדה בהעראה, אף כל בהעראה.

Rav Jonah said, and there are some who attribute it to Rav Huna son of Rav Joshua: The verse says: "All who do any of these abhorrences will have their souls cut off [from among their nation]" (Lev 18:29). All of the illicit sexual acts [listed in Leviticus 18] were connected to niddah. Just as for niddah, initiation of sexual contact [is sufficient for liability], so in all of them, initiation of sexual contact [is sufficient for liability].



The Talmud Yerushalmi, Kiddushin 1,1 (2a), is even more specific:

ר' יוסי בעא: הערייה בזכור מהו? הערייה בבהמה מה היא? וכל העריות לא מן הנידה למדו? זכור מינה, בהמה מינה.

R. Jose asked: What is the forbidden initiation of sexual contact between a man and another man? What is the forbidden initiation of sexual contact between a man and an animal? [He was answered:] Have we not learned about the forbidden sexual relations from the case of the menstruant woman? We learn the case of a man from there, and we learn the case of an animal from there.


This passage defines the Biblical injunction against the “lyings of a woman” with a man as the equivalent of what is forbidden with a menstruant woman. As far as I can tell, this source is not addressed in Dorff et al.

So, now, we know that העראה (I've been translating it as “initiation of sexual contact”) of ביאה שלא כדרכה (“sex the unusual way”) is sufficient to incur a Biblical penalty**. Both of these remain undefined terms.

The Talmud defines העראה (initiation) in a discussion in Yevamot 55b as “הכנסת עטרה”, the entry of the crown of the penis. Both Roth (pp8-9) and Dorff (note 25) agree on this point. Their primary disagreement is into which orifice(s) the penis must be inserted in order to incur a Biblical penalty.

One Talmudic case considered strong proof by Dorff et al that “the unusual way” only refers to anal intercourse is that of the androginus, a human with two sets of genitalia. (Simplifying, ) The halachic definition of a male is one with a penis, so, the androginus is male according to halacha, and, thus can be liable for relations with another man. From BT Yevamot 83b:

אמר רב שמואל בר יהודה א"ר אבא אחוה דר' יהודה בר זבדי אמר רב יהודה אמר רב: אנדרוגינוס חייבין עליו סקילה משתי מקומות. מיתיבי: רבי אליעזר אמר אנדרוגינוס חייבין עליו סקילה כבזכר. בד"א בזכרות שלו, אבל בנקבות שלו, פטור. הוא דאמר כי האי תנא דתניא רבי סימאי אומר: אנדרוגינוס חייבין עליו סקילה משתי מקומות. מ"ט דרבי סימאי? אמר רבא בר המדורי: אסברא לי "ואת זכר לא תשכב משכבי אשה." אי זהו זכר שיש בו שני משכבות? הוי אומר: זה אנדרוגינוס. ורבנן אע"ג דאית ביה שני משכבות "את זכר" כתיב. ורבנן זכר גרידא מנא להו? מ"ואת אשה." באשה שלא כדרכה מנא להו? מ"אשה."

Rav Samuel son of Judah said in the name of Rabbi Aba brother of Rabbi Judah son of Zveidi who said in the name of Rabbi Judah who said in the name of Rav: An androginus is liable for [the Biblical penalty of] stoning [for homosexual relations] from two places. They asked of him [from the mishna]: “Rabbi Eliezer said: An androginus is liable for stoning as a man” — “As a man” means to say “with his maleness” (בזכרות שלו), but in his femaleness (בנקבות שלו), he is not liable!? This tannaitic ruling agrees with another [Beraita]: “Rabbi Simai said: An androginus is liable for stoning from two places.” Why does Rabbi Simai rule this way? Rava son of Hamduri said: Explain to me [the verse, Lev 18:22] “Do not lie with a man the lyings of a woman”. What man has two “lyings”? This is the androginus! The opinion of the [other] rabbis is that even though he has two “lyings”, it is written “And a man” [that is, he is only liable for sex with male parts (Rashi)]. [But] according to the opinion of the rabbis [where the word “a man” is being used to remove the liability from the female part of the androginus], from where do we derive the law [against homosexual relations] in relation to a normal male? From “and to a woman”***. [According to both Rabbi Simai and the other rabbis, ] from where do we derive the law in relation to [illicit sexual relations between a man and woman] that the unusual way [is sufficient to incur a Biblical penalty? (We had thought that it was from the plural form of “lyings”, but this is already being used for different legal derivations -- Rashi)] From “a woman” (most likely referring to Lev. 18:22).


The ultimate ruling with regard to the androginus is unimportant for our purposes. Dorff et al would like “two places” to mean “two and only two”. There are a number of linguistic problems with the interpretation of this passage. One is pointed out by Roth (p12). “Femaleness” is universally equated with a vagina. The question then is the meaning of “maleness” in this context. Dorff et al equate it with an anus, following the Ritv"a (Rabbeinu Yom Tov ben Avraham Asevilli, 1255-1300; Dorff, note 31), who explicitly defines “maleness” as the “behind”. Roth prefers the term I translated as “maleness” to be understood according to its more frequent usage — “penis.” What Dorff's definition loses in linguistic fidelity, it gains in textual symmetry: the text refers to the two places an androginus can be penetrated and thus incur a penalty. The textual symmetry in Roth's definition is that both “maleness” and “femaleness” refer to genitalia. Either way, at least one “place” that is known to that author to result in a Biblical penalty is missing. For Dorff, it's the penis. For Roth, it's the anus (or the mouth, for that matter!). Both would argue based on their own versions of the textual parallelism that it is not expected to be there. This passage is therefore inconclusive.****

Colloquially, “sex the unusual way” likely means any nonvaginal sex. Roth suggests that it means any nonvaginal penetration (for reasons discussed below). However, from the Talmudic sources alone, there is little evidence of its legal definition. It could be specifically anal, or it could be more general. In some places, it could have one meaning, and in others, it could be a specific euphemism. Other sources are introduced by both Roth and Dorff. But, they are similarly inconclusive.

There is later evidence as to the possible meanings of “sex the unnatural way”. Dorff et al suggest that the Rashi on the language used in the rape of Dinah (Gen 34:2) proves that “the unusual way” is painful, and therefore, it must refer to anal sex. Rashi derives this from the midrash Bereshit Rabba chapter 5. Once again, however, this is not absolute proof, since there is no evidence that the term has only one meaning. In that case, Rashi had one of many specific meanings of the “unusual way” in mind when he wrote the commentary on Genesis.

The closest we come to an actual definition is Rashi on Yevamot 34b:

שלא כדרכה והעראה משכבת זרע נפקא - שלא כדרכה אינו מקום זרע העראה לאו שכבת זרע הוא דאין כאן זרע הלכך תרוייהו משכבת זרע מימעטי:

The unusual way and initiation are differentiated [legally] from [the Biblical category of] “intercourse involving seed” - The unusual way [means] ‘not in a place with procreative potential’, and initiation of sexual contact is not [considered intercourse involving seed] because there is no ejaculation. Both are eliminated [from incurring legal liability] wherever [the Torah says] “intercourse involving seed”.


This would seem to support Roth's more general understanding of sex “the unusual way”.

Another cited proof text is the Rashi on Niddah 13b that defines another term, sex דרך אברים, “by way of the limbs”, which the Talmud explicity excludes from the category of “lyings of a woman”. Rashi defines:

דרך אברים - היינו שכבת זרע לבטלה, ואינו משכב זכור דבמשכב זכור כתיב: "משכבי אשה".

[Sex] by way of the limbs -- This [is a sexual act that] wastes seed, but it is not considered [the legal equivalent of] “lying with a man” because all of the cases for “lying with a man” must be included in “the lyings of a woman” (Lev 18:22).


Roth's interpretation is that “by way of the limbs” refers to nonpenetrative sex acts, and “the unnatural way” refers to penetrative sex acts. Dorff et al include only anal sex in “the unnatural way”, and the remainder in “by way of the limbs”.

The earliest quoted primary source of an absolutely clear broad legal definition is in an edition of the Shulchan Aruch published in Venice in 1594 (Roth p10). The Ram"a on Even Haezer 25:2 which reads: “And has intercourse with her the usual way or the unusual way, but not by way of the anus, God forbid”. The proof text itself (italicized), which clearly includes non-anal intercourse in “sex the unusual way” is not in our editions of the Ram"a. I don't know whether the Venice 1594 edition is a more or less reliable one than the one we have.

The later commentators and halachists include ever broader definitions of the Biblical prohibition (see Mainmonides, the Shulchan Aruch, Tur, etc. quoted by Roth p13), deriving the prohibition against intercourse from “the lyings of a woman”, and the prohibition against all other sexual activity from Lev. 18:3.

To this point, all that we've determined is that the early sources can be read such that anal intercourse is the only Biblical prohibition. It is a plausible reading, but, truthfully, not that conclusive nor convincing. Roth's understanding is most consistent with the greatest number of halachic texts, including the Talmud and post-Talmudic codes. To this point, the differentiation is all just an academic exercise. Even if the remainder is not Biblically prohibited, it is certainly Rabbinically prohibited. A future post will (hopefully) look at the logic used by Dorff et al to overturn the remaining prohibitions.

Roth provides a number of philosophical objections to defining the Biblical prohibition narrowly. The first, from a halachic perspective, is the principle ספיקא דאורייתא לחומרא, that when there is an uncertainty with regard to application of a Biblical law, we rule stringently. The counterargument would be that this is a cop-out. The uncertainty here is not (yet) in application, it is in whether the law is actually Biblical. To the best of my knowledge, this principle is a guideline for deciding practical applications, not for categorizing. The second objection is essentially a slippery-slope argument. Roth argues that should we decide to limit the Biblical prohibition against homosexuality, there is no reason not to do the same for all the other sexual prohibitions in Lev. 18. However, deciding on the nature of the Biblical prohibition does no such thing automatically. Rabbinic prohibitions still prevent one from making any forms of bestiality or incest halachically legitimate. The ultimate question is whether there is any compelling reason to reconsider the Rabbinic prohibitions. Dorff et al are not suggesting that Rabbinic halacha is nonbinding. On the contrary, much of their case relies on Rabbinic jurisprudence. Roth's third objection is more sociological. He argues there is a difference between what a decisor would say to someone privately and what should be enshrined in law for all to read. But, the fact that this issue has come up as a societal issue rather than as a private issue demands a societal answer.

* A cynic would snicker at the parallels to the issue currently under discussion.

** I want to make absolutely clear here that when a halachist talks about a liability for a Biblical or Rabbinic penalty, it is not equivalent to a statement that the halachist thinks that someone should actually go out and punish another according to that penalty. Penalties are being used to make legal distinctions. Nothing more.

*** The text here is severely corrupted and it's a bit hard to tell which proof-verse is intended.

**** I should point out that even though the language is inconclusive, if you're willing to accept Dorff et al's perfectly reasonable understanding at face value, this passage is pretty much the only one presented that would strongly indicate that the sole definition of “sex the unusual way” is anal sex. (Updated: 1/12/2007)

Many thanks to DW for helping me proofread and copy-edit.

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Thursday, December 28, 2006

Homosexuality in halacha III: The Biblical text

All teshuvot referred to in the following posts on this subject will either be linked to from these posts or have previously been linked on my blog. While I may only reference names of first authors, this is being used as shorthand for the full author list. Page numbers refer to the CJLS-posted PDF versions.

The well-known Biblical sources for the prohibitions associated with homosexual relations are ‏וְאֶ֨ת־זָכָ֔ר לֹ֥א תִשְׁכַּ֖ב מִשְׁכְּבֵ֣י אִשָּׁ֑ה תּוֹעֵבָ֖ה הִֽוא "And [with] a man, do not sleep the way [you do with] a woman, it is an abhorrence," (Leviticus 18:22) and ‏וְאִ֗ישׁ אֲשֶׁ֨ר יִשְׁכַּ֤ב אֶת־זָכָר֙ מִשְׁכְּבֵ֣י אִשָּׁ֔ה תּוֹעֵבָ֥ה עָשׂ֖וּ שְׁנֵיהֶ֑ם מ֥וֹת יוּמָ֖תוּ דְּמֵיהֶ֥ם בָּֽם "And a man who sleeps with a man as [a man does] with a woman, both have committed an abhorrent act, they shall certainly be put to death, the bloodguilt is theirs" (Leviticus 20:13). The former comes in the context of a long list of sexual prohibitions and the latter comes in a similar list that adds penalties for the offenders.

It is clear from the language that the Biblical author had zero tolerance for homosexual sex. Attempts to read leniency directly into the text are bound to fail. One such attempt is made by Geller et al (pp9-10). First, they reject others' attempts to limit the context to exploitative or coercive sex as “unconvincing”. Then, they present their own theory that attempts to limit the context to sexual acts performed outside of a sanctified setting (eg, bestiality, homosexuality, incest). They bring in another theory attributed to Jacob Milgrom, that claims that the primary reason for the proscription of the acts is that they involve destruction of seed in ways that lack procreative potential. They conclude (based on a Talmudic interpretation) that the Torah really intended to teach that gay sex is real sex and is thus required to be performed in a sanctified context, for which there is none available. Therefore, because two men cannot sanctify their relationship through marriage, male-male intercourse is thoroughly prohibited. I don't understand the connection between the Geller theory and Milgrom's; they position in their paper as if Milgrom's provides theirs with support, but it seems to me that it does not.

There are problems with both theories. Among the prohibitions in the Holiness code is ‏וְאֶל־אִשָּׁ֖ה בְּנִדַּ֣ת טֻמְאָתָ֑הּ לֹ֣א תִקְרַ֔ב לְגַלּ֖וֹת עֶרְוָתָֽהּ “And do not approach a woman in the midst of her menstrual impurity to uncover her nakedness”(Lev. 20:19). That verse is the source of the niddah prohibitions which are still in force today. Niddah impurity occurs in the normal process of sanctified heterosexual marriage. Sex during the niddah period is more probably nonprocreative (although, if you include all the additional Rabbinically-ordained abstention time, niddah-observance could lead to the phenomenon of Orthodox infertility, that is prevent procreation). It certainly occurs by the same physical mechanism and in the same social context as procreative sex. Whether the biology was known to the Biblical author is questionable. Either way, these explanations are no more convincing than the ones the same authors rejected.

If any leniency at all can be found in the text itself, it would be found with the reason given by the Torah for the prohibitions. This is stated in (Lev 18:3):
‏כְּמַעֲשֵׂ֧ה אֶֽרֶץ־מִצְרַ֛יִם אֲשֶׁ֥ר יְשַׁבְתֶּם־בָּ֖הּ לֹ֣א תַעֲשׂ֑וּ וּכְמַעֲשֵׂ֣ה אֶֽרֶץ־כְּנַ֡עַן אֲשֶׁ֣ר אֲנִי֩ מֵבִ֨יא אֶתְכֶ֥ם שָׁ֙מָּה֙ לֹ֣א תַעֲשׂ֔וּ וּבְחֻקֹּתֵיהֶ֖ם לֹ֥א תֵלֵֽכוּ "Do not do the acts of the Land of Egypt where you dwelt; and do not do the acts of the Land of Canaan where I am bringing you; and do not follow their established practices."
and repeated at the end of the chapter (18:30):
‏וּשְׁמַרְתֶּ֣ם אֶת־מִשְׁמַרְתִּ֗י לְבִלְתִּ֨י עֲשׂ֜וֹת מֵחֻקּ֤וֹת הַתּֽוֹעֵבֹת֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר נַעֲשׂ֣וּ לִפְנֵיכֶ֔ם וְלֹ֥א תִֽטַּמְּא֖וּ בָּהֶ֑ם אֲנִ֖י יְהוָ֥ה אֱלֹהֵיכֶֽם And you shall observe My laws to avoid all of the abhorrent practices that are done before you; and do not become impure by them. I am YHVH your God."
On the one hand, this can be read as a blanket prohibition of all the acts described. On the other, it can be read as a prohibition only if they are like the acts of the Egyptians and Canaanites. However, any interpretation of the verses in this light would have to be well-supported by the historical evidence (of which there is little or none) and it would also have to encompass all of the prohibited acts listed. The argument from the source of the commandment is therefore difficult or impossible to make.

Contemporary Judaism (of all denominations), however, is not a Biblically fundamentalist religion. As described in an earlier post, practical halacha is a combination of biblical and rabbinic law, and both aspects are rabbinically determined. In the grand scheme of halacha, the interpretive rabbinic statements make a much larger impression.

There are two potentially unclear phrases in the Leviticus verses. One is משכבי אשה (“as [one] sleeps with a woman”) and the other is תועבה (“abhorrence”, “abomination”, or the like). All the teshuvot on the table dealt with תועבה as an attributed —that is, not absolute— quality of abhorrence. The most complete analysis was written by Roth for his 1992 work. That analysis was, in fact, more necessary for a negative answer than for a positive one. The Biblical assignment of homosexual sex as an abhorrence is a potential source for civil discrimination against homosexuals. If the assignment is merely attributed by the Torah for the sake of halacha, it is only valid in the halachic system, and Jews are permitted to push for advancing gay's civil rights in the secular sphere. This idea alone would be considered radical in some Orthodox circles. The differences between them are brought forward in the interpretation of exactly what acts משכבי אשה comprises. The definition, which cannot be found in the Biblical text, defines what the practical halacha considers to be Biblically prohibited. Any remaining prohibitions known to be “on the books” are rabbinic in nature, and potentially more adjustable.

The interpretation and limitation of these two words are, in my opinion, the most important hurdle for the permission granted by Dorff et al to cross. Firstly, their own internal logic requires that they be right about what is Biblically and rabbinically forbidden. Secondly, even if their argument about the methodology for overturning the rabbinic prohibitions is incorrect, if their methodology on the Biblical prohibitions is right, room is still left for others to fill in the missing piece without too much (social) damage to the very people they are trying to help. After all, once a permission of such importance to individuals has been granted and used, it is nearly impossible to rescind.

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Wednesday, December 13, 2006

Final CJLS teshuva released [updated]

The last of the approved CJLS homosexuality teshuvot has been released. It is available (once again, in MS Word format :-( ) at this link. All the teshuvot (approved and not) are available from one place at the Rabbinical Assembly website.

This final release will give us all the ability to determine for ourselves whether the (approved) Levy teshuva is totally off the wall.

[UPDATE: All the teshuvot are now in PDF format:


This should correct the strange interpretation of right-to-left letter ordering that showed up in some versions of MS Word in the previous copies of the documents.]

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Tuesday, December 12, 2006

Additional delay expected

Now that Joel Roth's new paper has been released, I expect there to be an additional delay in my response to the Dorff-Nevins-Reisner teshuva. Roth's 55 page document (in addition to his previous 63 page document) directly addresses the arguments in Dorff et al (and some of the other teshuvot that were not accepted). A compare-contrast of the use and interpretation of sources would be a worthwhile exercise.

I expect that my first substantive post will be about the role of science in these teshuvot.

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Monday, December 11, 2006

More papers released

And they are...

Joel Roth's "Homosexuality Revisited". Passed.
Myron Geller, Robert Fine and David Fine's "The Halakhah of Same-Sex Relations in a New Context" (labeled as a "dissent," presumably, to Roth or Levy). Declared a takkanah because it called for sweeping changes. Failed at a vote. As a dissenting opinion, it is not considered an official paper of the CJLS.
Loel Weiss's "A Concurring Opinion to Levy". Apparently, not voted on. As a concurring opinion, it is not an official opinion of the CJLS.
From Weiss's paper, we now know the title of Levy's teshuva: "Same-Sex Attraction and Halakhah." It is the last remaining official position that is not available to the public, and the one that has caused the most confusion as to its content.

(via Canonist)

Regrettably, they're all in (non-free) MS Word format. They open up correctly in OpenOffice.org.

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Sunday, December 10, 2006

Brief interlude: Another paper released

Gordon Tucker's essay/teshuva is now on his shul's website.* This paper got 7 votes in the CJLS. Had it been an ordinary teshuva it would have been declared a legitimate followable opinion in the Conservative movement. Because it called for very sweeping changes, it was declared a takkanah (decree). I've seen and heard a number of different numbers thrown around for how many votes it would have required to pass, ranging from a true majority to unanimity. Either way, it did not pass.

*It still has the "DRAFT -- NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR DISTIBUTION" warning in big letters on the top, but, he seems to have put it up himself and it's being circulated through a number of email lists. If I find that it was not really intended to be released, I'll remove the link.

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Homosexuality in halacha, post II: Biblical and Rabbinic law

Within the halachic system, there are two possible sources of law. These are Biblical law and Rabbinic law. Within the Conservative understanding, both are considered equally binding. The excuse “it's just Rabbinic anyway” has no meaning. Introducing this distinction, however, is one place where the system becomes really complicated. The reason is that a law being written in the Torah does not necessarily make its literal word a "Biblical law" and a law's specifics not being found anywhere in the Bible does not make them "Rabbinic Law." The distinction itself is Rabbinic in origin! The forbidden manners of work on Shabbat is one example where this concept can be made abundantly clear. The Torah explicitly forbids “creative work” (a loose translation of “מלאכה”) on the Sabbath. Few of what modern Jews recognize as the “39 categories” are directly mentioned in the Torah as forbidden. And, some acts which are directly mentioned as forbidden are not contained in the 39 categories. The categories were derived (or, better, “derived”) from the Torah. Other activities were forbidden by the authority of the Rabbis in order to prevent the transgression of the Biblical laws.

The distinction between Biblical and Rabbinic law does have some practical implications. The first is that, as a general principle, one should rule stringently in an indeterminate case of a transgression of Biblical law, and one should rule leniently in an indeterminate case of a transgression of Rabbinic law. Another distinction is that while both are binding, the "legislative process" of interpretation proceeds differently. Overturning Biblical law (within the confines of the system) is difficult. Overturning or changing Rabbinic law may involve showing that it no longer provides any protection against transgression of a Biblical law, or that its stated social purpose is no longer valid. By the nature of the system, it is far easier to add new Rabbinic prohibitions than to remove old prohibitions, whether they be Biblical or Rabbinic. As a very loose analogy to secular law, Biblical law resembles a written constitution, and Rabbinic law resembles ordinary legislation. While this analogy holds to some extent for Rabbinic law decided at the time of the Talmud, contemporary Rabbinic law more resembles case law than actual legislation.

There are two processes of halachic decision-making available to contemporary rabbinic bodies. The first is the takkanah, or decree, where a Rabbinic authority makes declaration of new law that becomes binding on the community that accepts that authority (as far as I can tell, this usually a means adding a new prohibition, not removing one). The second process is responsa. Under this process, a questioner asks a rabbi or rabbinic authority for a decision. A teshuva (literally, answer) is a clarification of the halacha under the particular circumstance that is asked. The "clarification" effectively adds new binding case law.

Because Rabbinic law is considered more malleable, one way the Rabbis approach halacha is to begin with a known Biblical law, limit its scope, then legislate the remainder Rabbinically. A classical example of this process is the theory underlying the eruv that allows Jews to carry otherwise-Sabbath-permitted objects outside on Shabbat. Carrying outside in the public domain is considered a transgression of Biblical law, which cannot be undone through Rabbinic intercession. The solution to the problem, one that is nearly universally accepted today, was to define a limited scope of the Biblical prohibition (effectively, removing the possibility that one can transgress the Biblical prohibition), regulate the remainder of Shabbat carrying activities under Rabbinic law, and provide an exception to the Rabbinic prohibition, namely, the eruv.

The previous discussion is relevant because there is clearly a Biblical prohibition related to homosexual relations. Our teshuvot -- whether permissive or not permissive -- have to address the nature of this prohibition. The teshuvot purport to be working within the system of halacha. Therefore, they must limit themselves to providing an answer within the boundaries of their authority. Should a question be asked, and there is no opposition between halachic principles, the decision is clear. No responsum can make pork kosher. It is in this context that I set out to read the Dorff-Nevins-Reisner teshuva.

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Homosexuality in halacha, post I: secular context (with clarification)

There are a number of important differences between secular and religious law that impact issues of the rights of homosexuals. Perhaps the first is that the language of "civil rights" is primary in secular law, and mostly irrelevant in halacha. The basis of secular law in a democracy is that there is a necessity for government, but its powers are limited through a social contract with the governed. The government's powers are limited by the people's rights. The basis of adherence to Jewish religious law is traditional. Whether the initial origin of the law was Divine, Divinely-inspired or entirely human is irrelevant to this discussion. The language of halacha is that of positive and negative obligations. The specific decision related to positive obligations is whether a certain act is merely permitted or required. The specific decision related to negative obligations is whether the act is permitted or forbidden. An important point is that adherence to halacha is, for practical purposes, entirely voluntary. This is especially true within the Conservative Movement, where strict adherence is the exception, rather than the norm. Unlike in Chareidi communities, practicially, one may still function as a member of a Conservative community and forego most private practice.
Legislation of private, consensual sexual activity is anathema to secular democracy. It is well within the domain of halacha. Within the system of halacha, heterosexuals, too, have limits placed on their private sexuality. Sexual intercourse is limited to the context of marriage. Even within marriage, the laws of family purity forbid sexual relations during certain times, and sexual activity is forbidden on Yom Kippur and until midday on the Ninth of Av clarified.
The differences between secular and Judaic law are emphasized in R. Joel Roth's 1992 teshuva. In the postscript to his 1992 teshuva, he wrote:

The United States legal system, however, is not a religious legal system. It behooves us, therefore, to reflect briefly on the practical consequences of the difference bwteen a religious and a secular legal system vis-a-vis the issue of homosexuality.... It is far harder to argue that those same reasons [for forbidding homosexual relations] are of legitimate concern to a secular legal system. Indeed, one would be very hard pressed to defend that claim at all. . . . I am unable to offer any cogent argument to demonstrate why the private sexual acts of consenting adults should present any danger or threat to the legitimate interests of the state itself or to its citizens, under common circumstances. Therefore, I can see no justification for civil legislation proscribing such acts....
There is no inconsistency whatsoever in making the halakhic claims made in this paper, on the one hand, and asserting absolute opposition to any infringement of the civil rights of homosexuals on the other. (emph added)


So, even if a Conservative Jew accepts that all homosexual activity is forbidden by halacha, that same Jew, need not be homophobic. In fact, he may actively support gay and lesbian civil rights with a clear religious conscience. Given the history of the Jewish people as a minority persecuted at the hands of a majority for religious reasons, that permission should even be seen by the Jewish community as a cultural obligation.

clarified Even according to the most lenient Conservative position of Theodore Friedman. All the more so for the traditional and more prevalent custom [also affirmed by David Golinkin] which holds that the Ninth of Av prohibitions continue to last all day. Thanks to Mar Gavriel for pointing out that this statement required clarification.

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Friday, December 08, 2006

Dorff-Nevins-Reisner teshuva online

Rabbi Nevins posted the center-permissive responsum on his website. I intend to write my own analysis of it, but, it's quite long and I haven't read it yet.

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Thursday, December 07, 2006

The day after the CJLS decision

Unless you've been living in a cave, you've probably heard about the CJLS's approval of three contradictory responsa on the issue of the position of gays and lesbians in the Jewish community. I would wonder if the press release qualifies as one of the most successful press releases ever in terms of fast promulgation.

Immediate analysis (and reporting) of the decision and its fallout (notably, the resignations of four CJLS members) may be found elsewhere. I intend to reserve most comment in detail until the final text of the approved teshuvot is released to the public. It's a bit hard to comment when one does not know the content of what he's commenting about. When they are released, I might do an analysis of their arguments.

From the early indications, it seems like the CJLS did the right thing for two out of the three documents. Approving contradictory statements (Roth's and Dorff's) leaves a pluralistic approach open. From what I've read, one of the texts advocates the scientifically unsound "restorative therapy" approach (I haven't read the text myself, take what I say for the nothing it's worth).

UPDATE: R. Nevins, who voted against Levy's responsum, called the statement that it advocates "restorative therapy" a "distortion." If so, it was distorted by the CJLS's own press office. Openness can clear this up. Hint, hint, CJLS...

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